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This dissertation calls on the public law
field to

expand its focus beyond courts, especially the
Supreme
Court, to take account of constitutional
interpretative

activity taking place elsewhere.

The field's narrow

focus on courts leads us astray in our attempts to

explain American constitutionalism fully.

The talk on

the Constitution taking place in the academy, the

Congress, the community, and state legislative forums
is

part of the activity which has mistakenly be ignored

as interpretive practice by the public law field.

This work restructures the framework of analysis
to explain the larger picture of American

constitutional politics.

I

do four case studies of

this politics using textual qualitative analysis of

conference papers, legal briefs, proselytizing tracts,
and legislative testimony to look at an academic

conference, community struggles against corporate

vi

i

disinvest, Congress's interpretive practice,
and
state legislature's vote against calling for

a

a

constitutional convention.
The first study is of a conference held in

celebration of the Bicentennial of the Constitution.
This conference expands sources for constitutional

meaning as it recalls 19th century Reconstruction era

constitutional debates.

The second study is of

movement activity to establish

a

constitutional

property right to stem the tide of corporate
disinvestment.

Workers and communities have

constructed a constitutional claim that they have
right to save jobs.

Congress'

a

institution of its own

law offices to join the Supreme Court in constitutional

debate is the subject of the third study.

With the

formation of its own law offices, Congress has

established control over its constitutional arguments
before the Court.

Finally,

I

look at testimony taken

by the Connecticut General Assembly on the call for

second constitutional convention.

This testimony

reveals a quasi-religious attachment of Americans to
their document.

Rather than representing a deep

commitment to democracy, however, it appears to
represent an impediment to it.

vi

i i

a

All of this activity is part o£
American

constitutional interpretive activity but
traditionally
has not been understood as such.

definition to this activity,

I

In giving new

expand the framework of

analysis of constitutional interpretive activity
and
our understanding of it.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

More than two decades ago, Judith Shklar
described
the ideological implications of the
legal frame for

perceptions of rights and constitutionalism.

1

Shklar's

theory of "legalism"

in

political culture

especially receptive to the talk

is

about the Constitution.

America explained why our

Traditionally

in

America

according to Shklar, legal forms have channeled
political action as well as legitimated

it.

The

ideology of legalism, according to Shklar, encourages
us

to think of

law as out "there" and separate from

politics. Shklar suggested new ways to think about law;
to regard

it

as part of a social continuum.

Shklar

said that
At one end of the scale of legalistic values
and institutions stand its most highly
articulate and refined expressions, the
courts of law and the rules they follow; at
the other end is the personal morality of all

those men and women who think of goodness as
obedience to the rules that properly define
their duties and rights.
Within this scale
there is a vast area of social beliefs and
institutions, both more and less rigid and
explicit, which in varying degrees depend
upon the legalistic ethos. 2

1
See Judith Shklar, Legal ism
Harvard University Press, 1964).

2

See Judith Shklar, Legal ism,

(Cambridge:

p.

3.

2

The challenge to integrate law and
politics that
she laid down was taken up a decade
later by Jonathan

Casper-

and Stuart Scheingold.*

These scholars

brought new perspectives to the public
law field with
their examination of law in American society.
They
placed legal thinking within the context of
politics.
At the beginning of the last decade,

in an essay

reviewing the state of the research on law and society,
Richard Abel 5 declared the original paradigm of liberal

legalism exhausted and challenged scholars to construct
a

new one by challenging the ideology directly in

attempting to develop alternatives.

In addition to his

critique, Abel suggested ways to discover the needed

alternatives.

Among them was the suggestion that

sociolegal scholars should broaden the meaning of
justice itself by,

"Stepping outside the ideology

through which legal institutions seek legitimation and
asking what the public views as just and where it
perceives significant injustice in the operation of

3

Rights

See Jonathan D. Casper, The Politics of Civil
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

See Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
*

s

See Richard L. Abel,

"Redirecting Social Studies
(1980):805.

of Law," Law and Society Review 14

3

law."-

it

is

somewhat surprising in

a

democracy that

the idea ot seeking input from
the people on their view
of law is offered as a new approach.
Nevertheless, it
is,

but the new approach that Abel called
for is not

more gap studies that implicitly endorse
formal legal

institutions' view of the law by checking to
see

public knowledge measures up to it.

if

7

The gap study perspective continues to bind
even

those scholars who aim their attention at the
people

rather than their institutions.

Michael Kammen* made

a

study ot the cultural impact of the United States

Constitution in an attempt to describe the place of the

Constitution in the public consciousness and symbolic
life of the American people.

He said of his study,

"...I consider this a study in popular

constitutionalism, by which

1

mean the perceptions and

mispercept ions, uses and abuses, knowledge and
ignorance of ordinary Americans.
in 1920,

6

1,9

Kammen notes that

the Constitution and the Declaration of

See Richard L. Abel,
828-29.

"Redirecting Social Studies

of Law," p.
7

See Austin Sarat, "Legal Effectiveness and
Social Studies of Law:
On the Unfortunate Persistance
of a Research Tradition," Legal Studies Forum 10
(1985) :23.
a

See Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of
Itself (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986).
9

See Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of

Itself, p. xi.

Independence were taken out of

a

vault at the State

Department to be put on display in order
to bolster
American morale in resisting bolshevism. "

(m

of words,

we brought out our biggest guns.)

a war

This

instrumental use of the Constitution was taken
up by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service
around this

same time.

The increase in immigration into the
United

States combined with growing isolationist and

xenophobic attitudes encouraged the U.S. government
to
use knowledge of the Constitution as both a test
of

understanding of the American system as well as
at its shores.

a

gate

Successful immigrants had to prove

a

"fair" knowledge of the document with the INS deciding

what was fair.

In order to exclude "undesirable"

aliens, trick questions were often asked.

For example,

which grocery stores are allowed to use false scales?
Or,

double questions might be used allowing the

inspector to accept or reject an answer according to
the applicant.

Underlying these abuses of

constitutionalism, however, was

a

sense that those

living here must be or become "American" and the

Constitution was at the heart of Americanism.

10

U s elf

,,

11

11

See Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of
p.

223

.

See Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of
P-

236.

5

Kammen's meticulous account of the
American
culture of popular constitutionalism
puts its emphasis
on popular misconceptions of
constitutionalism

and its

American variant.

Sotirios Barber has explored another

kind of constitutional consciousness.

Rather than

checking public awareness against some
constitutional
scoreboard, Barber suggested the theoretical
foundation
tor an individual's being "constitution
minded" on her

own terms.

Barber says,

"...a court cannot simply tell

us the meaning of this Constitution;

for ourselves.

Courts cannot achieve

state of affairs on their own." 12

we have to see it
a

constitutional

Research in the

public law field, however, with its focus on courts

-

especially the Supreme Court and on its product, the
judicial opinion

-

the whole process,

rather than all the interactions of

encourages the myth of legalism that

includes the idea that law

is

the special province of

experts and can be known and understood to the public

only through their mediation.

Barber's call for

everyone to be "constitution minded", not just the
experts,

is

part of a larger concern of some in the

public law field that research expand the domain of
what is understood as the study of the law.

12 See Sotirios A.

Barber, On What the

Constitution Means (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1984), p. 213.

6

Speaking to the topic of the
appropriate direction
Of law and society research
twenty years after those

constructs were melded into

a

scholarly association and

journal,- Susan Silbey and Austin Sarat
called
attention to the minutiae of social
life.

for

In spite of

American legalism's claim to the rule
of law, at the
periphery of American society - in small
towns,

places, working class neighborhoods

rural

we can see people

resisting "the penetration of official legal
norms as
they construct their own local universe of
legal

values

and behavior."

1 *

Silbey and Sarat attribute this

scholarly attention to the post-Viet Nam, PostWatergate America in which our highest legal

aspirations have been disappointed.
that,

They conclude

"We need to stop trying quite so hard to come to

terms with that ineffectiveness and to start studying
what legal life is like in the vast interstices of
law." 13

John Brigham's recent research on popular

13 The

Law and Society Association and The Law and
Society Review
.

14 See Susan S. Silbey and Austin Sarat,
"Critical
Traditions in Law and Society Research," Law and
Society Review 21 (1987):173.

18 See John Brigham,

"Bad Attitudes: Survey
Research, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Practice."
Paper presented to panels on "Public Discourse and Law:
The Role of the Citizen," Midwest Political Science
Association, April 13-15, 1989; and "Legal Culture and
Legal Claims," Law and Society Meetings, Madison,
Wisconsin, June 8-11, 1989.

7

"attitudes" about the law versus expert
opinion on the
law has already moved into the domain
suggested by
Silbey and Sarat. Focusing on images
of and

"attitudes" toward property rights, Brigham
explains
the marginalization of the public in an
area of special

importance to them.

because

it

The public becomes marginalized

does not have access to the discourse of the

law and bureaucracy which acts upon them rather
than

with them.

Brigham writes that

The authority of legal claims and the power
of the government over property lies in
determination about the way the world is, not
about how people feel about it.... All
assertions of property rights are subject to
correction and refinement by experts but the
authority of the poor to participate in the
discussion is substantially diminished by a
lack of autonomy and the technical discourse
of welfare property. XG

While the courts, especially the Supreme Court,

continue to command the most attention when the

Constitution

is

discussed, there is a palpable

constitutional consciousness in popular American
politics that takes on the Constitution on its own
terms that should command our attention as well.

This

was most recently apparent when 250,000 people marched
in

Washington to assert their view that Roe

ls See John Brigham,

v.

Wade was

"Bad Attitudes: Survey
Research, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Practice,"
p. 23-24.

8

correctly decided.-

After all,

the courts as passive

agents can initiate nothing themselves,
someone else
must think first in constitutional
terms and bring the
claim to the Court only later, if at all.
Yet this

aspect of constitutionalism

is

too often unexamined in

the leap to look at what courts ultimately
legitimate
as constitutional.
In addition,
of

often when there has been integration

law and politics in the scholarship, the tradition

in public

law has been to look at lawyers, courts, and

judges from the outside exposing the politics within.
This is the particular contribution of the legal

realists who showed that far from the law's being

discovered on some special cloud above politics from
which it occasionally rains down, law

result of the play of politics itself.

is

in fact the

Sheldon Goldman

has pointed to four of those intersections:

choices are made within

a

policy

political context, decisions

result from group bargaining, justices come to the

17 April

1989.
Whether this demonstration
influenced the Court or not we do not know but the
capacity of a demonstration to influence the timing if
not the content of a decision has been documented.
According to David O'Brien, Chief Justice Hughes
refused to hand down Powell v. Alabama (1932) in order
See
to end picketing that had surrounded the Court.
W.W. Norton &
David O'Brien, Storm Center (New York:

Co.,

1986), p.

277.

.

bench from an active
Live nuhiir
nt- and politics
pudlic life,
generate
the issues brought to
the

courts."

My thesis extends this
model to explain the
interaction of law and politics
taking place outside
judicial institutions.
I
am interested in political
activity generated by strongly
held popular beliefs
about the purpose and promise
of the Constitution.
Political activity li ke this may
be pursued through
legal institutions but does
not begin or end with
judicial opinions.
The right-to-life / r ight-to-choose
movements, the comparable worth
movement, and the antiviolent pornography movement are
representative of this
sort of constitutional politics as are
the four case
studies developed in the chapters that follow.
This

research

is

what Martin Shapiro describes as the

essential task of the political scientist

-

undertaking

"the careful description of what one real person
says
to another real person,

when, how, and why." 19

My interest, therefore, is in noting popular

conversations on the Constitution.

These conversations

are not aimed at mining the Constitution for a pre-

i a

See Sheldon Goldman, Constitut ional Law: Cases
and Essavs (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1987), pp. 3-4.
19

See Martin Shapiro, "Wither Political
Jurisprudence: A Symposium." Western Political Science
Quarterly 36 1983 ): 541-8
(

.

existent right and then staking

a

legal claim on

it.-

The tact of a constitutional
tradition is important.
The written text, used to justify
judicial review,

provides us with words to read and
discuss.
Consequently, the Constitution must be
understood not
simply as rules but as a way of talking
about things
political.
John Brigham argues that
...it is necessary to distinguish between
the
rules which designate certain procedures
and
the grammar which reveals the practices
on
which the procedures are based.
The impact
of grammar on a decision is far more
subtle
and potentially more revealing than the rules
that we traditionally look to for insight
into the role of law in judicial

interpretation 21

The text and commentary provides the opportunity for

what James Boyd White calls "interpretation as

action." 22

And,

it

also keeps the discourse on rights

and constitutionalism public.

This dissertation expands the domain of the public

law field as it responds to the searching self -analysis
that began in 1982 at the Western Political Science
20

For that activity, see, for example, Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Ri ghts Seriously (Cambridge Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1977).
21 See John Brigham, Constitu tional Language:
interpretation of Judicia l Decision (Westport,

A

Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978).
22 See James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their
Meaning: Consti tutions a nd Recon st itutions of Lan guage.

Character, and Community (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1984).

Association meeting in San Diego and
continued into
1984,

1987, and 1988 at annual meetings of the
American

Political Science Association.

At these meetings there

were round-tables which asked about
the future of the
public law field in political science.
The Amherst

Seminar's answer in

T he legal

studio vnr»^ * several

years ago was that the field should break
out of the
old confines of public law analysis with
its emphasis
on the appellate opinion by advocating
joint research

projects that come at the study of law and politics
not
only from more than one perspective but from more
than
one discipline.

Rogers Smith of Yale reiterated the

question in the Spring 1988 issue of the American
P olitical

Science Review

.

2"

Smith advocated applying

the innovations in theory of the parent discipline of

political science to the public law field.

For

example, he wondered what explanatory power the "new

institutionalism" has for the study of law and
politics.

Its insight is that there is a symbiosis

between institutions and political actors that
influences the perspectives of both the institution and
the actor.

Smith notes that what goes before

previous judicial opinions

-

can determine not only

23 The Legal
Studies Forum IX
2 *

-

(1985).

See Rogers Smith, "Political Jurisprudence, The
'New Institutionalism,' and the Future of Public Law."
82
1988 ): 89-108
(

.

.

.

s

future opinions but what gets into
court at all.
The
past development of the institution
can determine which
voices are heard in court.
Smith explained that

Obviously, no group is likely greatly
to
intluence an institution that will not
attend
to its voice. ... Thus, accounts of
self
interested rational calculations and the
behavioral regularities they are thought to
generate will have limited explanatory power
if they are not sensitive to how
legacies of
past decisions lead people to think their
interests should be so defended.
Neglect of
these factors may also prevent us from seeing
how social definitions of interests appear
much less rational, and much more vulnerable
to alteration over time, when their origins
are ident i f i ed 2

William Connolly suggested this view several years
before when he pointed to the importance of the "terms
of political discourse."

Connolly said then that

the language of politics is not a neutral
medium that conveys ideas independently
formed; it is an institutionalized structure
of meanings that channels political thought
and action in certain directions.
Those who
simply use established concepts to get to the
facts of political life, those who act

unref lect ively within the confines of
established concepts, actually have the
perceptions and modes of conduct available to
them limited in subtle and undetected ways. 26

23 See Rogers Smith,

'New Institutionalism,
p. 98-99.
26

•

"Political Jurisprudence, The
and the Future of Public Law,"

See William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political
Discourse 2nd Edition (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1983).

For some groups,

like out-of-work steelworkers

to get recognition tor their

,

trying

idea of a right to the

industrial property in their community,

a

"community

property right," was an achievement in
itself. ="
Their struggle fits the critique of
the Critical Legal
Studies- movement whose claim is that determining

what

appears, or is accepted, as rational when
making

rational choice is the whole game.

a

Brigham's work

points here as well when he reveals welfare
recipients'

language being "corrected" or ignored by their

caseworkers as they attempt to explain their own
sense
of their rights. 29

Underlying these calls for innovation and new

direction

is a

growing concern that the law schools are

winning the battle to cover the public law field as
they re-define it narrowly as doctrinal analysis and

jurisprudence.

We see this in the university as well

when undergraduate courses on constitutional law are

taught by political scientists as mini-law school

courses utilizing the case method.

This narrow

27

This struggle to establish in the polity the
idea of a right to retain disinvesting industries as a
constitutional right is detailed in chapter two within.
2S

Critical Legal Studies is a movement of legal
scholars from elite law schools who are calling for a
new left perspective on the law.
29
See John Brigham, "Bad Attitudes: Survey
Research, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Practice."

definition constrains our understanding
of American
constitutional interpretive practice
by riveting our
attention on the domain of the legal
profession.

Harry

Stumpf attempts to move us away from
the purely
judicial decision and process mode by
expanding the
arena of the political jurisprudent
to judicial

politics that include bar association
presidents,
prosecutors, and law enforcement officials.

30

While

casting the net further afield, this approach
like
those coming before continues to leave out
of the

analysis ail actors not formally part of the legal
process.

Public law analysis should include these

latter participants as well.

This study of the popular politics that, as

constitutional interpretive practice, inform the way we
understand the Constitution as a society

is

responsive

to calls from within the field for new direction.

does so,

It

in Judith Shklar's words of twenty-five years

ago, by breaking through the ethos of legalism to

expose the other important junctures of law and

politics in American society.

This research follows in

the tradition of the work of Jack Peltason and Martin

Shapiro who first called for

jurisprudence."
30

a

"political

Peltason did the path breaking work in

See Harry Stumpf, American Judicial Politics
(San Diego: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Publishers,
1988)
.

3

.

15

his

rmirrg *n

t.

he

ponricai

Pm,.^

in whlch he

described judges as participants in
the political

process.-

He put his emphasis on process
rather than

product (i.e., the appellate opinion.)

with this

changed structure of analysis, Peltason
looked at the
federal courts as part of the larger
politics of
interest group struggle.
work in his 1964 essay,

Martin Shapiro endorsed this
"Political Jurisprudence-

giving this new approach its name.

32

Shapiro

contributed further not long after in Law and Pnlif^.
;n the Supreme Court by analyzing the Supreme Court
as

an agency of government

3

This new frame of reference

helped to further refine political jurisprudence.
In spite of these insights which recall the

earlier vision of Jerome Frank who had long before

called our attention to the "upper court myth" in the
1930's and 1940's, public law has still not weaned

itself enough from the appellate decision as the focus
of

its attention.

3 +

To call our attention not only to

31 See Jack Peltason,

Federal C ourts in the
Political Process (New York: Random House, 1955).
32 See Martin Shapiro,
"Political Jurisprudence."
Kentucky Law Journal 52 (1964):294.
33 See Martin Shapiro,

Law and Politics in the
Supreme Court: New Ap proaches to Jurisprudence (New
York: The Free Press, 1964).
34 See Jerome Frank, "The Cult of the Robe,"
Saturday Review 29 (1945):12.

"

.

the decisional process
but also to the forces
and
influences that impinge upon
that process, Harry stumpf
titled his recent text Amer.cn .mH
-

Ma|1

rather than "judicial process."

m

p

mir

.

this work, stumpf

reviewed research that explains
the legal profession,
judicial selection, the state
and federal court
systems, and the criminal justice
system in terms of
the polity that constitutes those
systems.

Austin

Sarat extended this model to what
he calls "extended
case discussion" which looks at the
politics that lead
up to,

encompass, and lead away from the case
itself.

What forces align to transform a political
claim into a
legal one?
What is the purpose of litigation
in a

particular case?

A means?

An end?

What politics

eventuate from the decision?
By attending to these details, we see the larger

picture of law and politics.
field,

it

is

More important for the

attention to these details that

particular forte of political scientists.

is the

The law

schools can remain riveted to the appellate case but

political scientists must explain that case in the

context of politics.

Further, political scientists

must explain the role that law,

itself, plays in

3S See Austin Sarat, "Legal Effectiveness
and
Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunate Persistance
of a Research Tradition," Legal Studies Forum 19
1985
23
(

)

:

.

.

politics.

Several years ago, Walter Murphy-

called

on political scientists to
regain their rightful place
as interpreters of the
Constitution and the politics

that surround it.

in this vein, Murphy developed
his

own model of constitutional
interpretation that he

called a "modified departmentalism." 37

There he

posited a theory of separation of powers
and

constitutional interpretation that gave to each
branch
an ultimate say in those areas of
greatest concern to
it

Clearly, the calls for the integration of law
and

politics have not fallen on deaf ears in the
public law
field but they have still elicited too few responses

that are not structured around legal institutions and

judicial doctrine which serves to reinforce the purely
legal model of constitutionalism.

Louis Fisher

is

one

who does go beyond this purely legal model to examine
the executive and legislative branches for their

constitutional interpretive practices.

38

He offers

evidence of interpretive activity in all three branches
3S

See Walter F. Murphy, "Who Shall Interpret?"
The Political Sci ence Teacher 49 (1986):10.
37

See Walter F. Murphy, "Who shall Interpret?
The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter,"
The Revie w of Politics 48
1985 ): 401-23
(

38

See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1988
)

.

that contributes to our
full understanding of the
Constitution.
while this activity by the
three
branches is not new, the
understanding of it all as

contributing to constitutional
interpretation is.
Fisher shows that the Supreme
Court is

neither the only

constitutional interpreter nor the
final one.
Stuart Scheingold is another who
stimulated new
thinning some years ago as he exposed
new truths about
the etficacy of rights struggles
using litigation
strategies.
He concluded then that legal
strategies,
as they aim deep at the transformation
of cultural
awareness and assertion, work only as political

mobilization mechanisms.
litigation

is

Nevertheless, he argued,

viable politically because, even though

it does

little to affect institutions and power holders

per se,

it does

force popularly.

serve as a rights consciousness-raising
Using doctrinal analysis put in its

historical and political context, Jonathan Casper
showed this as well.

He,

like Shklar, argued against

the tradition of viewing legal doctrine in isolation

from the larger society of which it is

Casper

a part.

responded to the lament that the courts should stay out
of politics and stick to deciding legal questions on

legal grounds with the assertion that constitutional

issues do not simply involve fine points of law but

rather the allocation of values.

Legal tools

-

.

reasoning by analogy, stare
decisis, etc. - can be
brought to Dear on the problem
but constitutional
interpretation itself remains always
a

political

problem that should not be separated
from political
analys is
For Harvard Law Professor,
Martha Minow," a

written constitution
discussion.

it

is

the starting point of

is not so

important that particular

actions are protected or prohibited
but rather that we
are constituted as a community by
the Constitution and
with it have a basis on which to make

claims about what

is

or

is not embraced by that community.

This is also

what Sotirios Barber- 0 is talking about
when he calls
on everyone

-

not just judges and lawyers

"constitution minded."

-

to be

Barber does not deny the

special authority of judges but he also calls on us
as

citizens to form and express our own view of "what the

Constitution means."
We must decide for ourselves what the Constitution

means because our view contributes to what Gerald

39

See Martha Minow, "Interpreting Rights: An
Essay for Robert Cover," Yale Law Journal 96 (1987):1860.
*° See Sotirios Barber,

On What the Constitution
Means (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984
)

.

.

Garvey- calls
is

.'const itutional

bricolage."

the French word lor the
process

Bricolage

by which a

craftsman fabricates -make-dosolutions to problems
as they arise, using a
limited and often severely
limiting store of doctrines,
materials and tools..."With constitutional tools the
judge or craftsman can
build a consistent body of
constitutional
doctrine.

Constitutional bricolage
available to the judge

-

-

what materials and tools are

reflects the larger process of

society's trying to maintain its consistency
and
identity over time which Garvey calls
society's syntax.
Because society's syntax informs and limits
judges'

doctrinal choices, important politics take
place at the
level of constructing and reconstructing that
syntax.

The Constitution, then, should be understood not
as

blueprint for

a

community but rather as

a

a

facilitator

of social conversation on what constitutes the

community, not the document.

43

Consequently,

interpretive constitutional discourse

is

important

constitutional politics.
See Gerald Garvey, Constitut ional Bricolaqp
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1971
)

.

* 2

p

.

5

See Gerald Garvey, Constitutional Bricolage

,

.

*3

See Martha Minow, "Interpreting Rights: An
Essay for Robert Cover" for further discussion of this

idea

When someone

-

legislator, citizen

political activist, scholar,
-

claims to know the promise
or

parameters of the Constitution,
she is participating in
constitutional interpretive practice.
The aim is not
always to affect specific
policy outcomes
but more

often to construct the arena
within which those policy
choices must be made.
This is the struggle to shape
the community's definition of
itself.

it

is

the

struggle for the ascendant idea or,
in Garvey's words,
to determine society's syntax.
This is
the heart of

constitutional politics.
Constitutional politics are politics that
focus on
and make claims about the meaning and
promise
of the

Constitution and thereby of American life.
overarching thesis

is

My

that the public law field has led

us astray with its contribution to our
understanding of

American constitutionalism.

It has

focused on the

Constitution in the appellate courts, especially the
Supreme Court, when the full picture of American

constitutional politics

is more than this.

Therefore,

this dissertation looks at the politics that often

point toward the Supreme Court but do not begin or end
there.

The Court is one obviously very important arena

in which these politics are played out.

There are

others, however, that contribute to the picture:

the

Congress, the academy, the community, and the state

iorums tor che amending
process as examples.
The
chapters ot this dissertation
are devoted to each o£
these arenas.

Chapter One turns to the academy
to follow the
discourse on the Constitution of
those scholars who
teach the future Supreme Court
clerks, practitioners,
judges and justices as well as
those who write the
record of that discourse - academic
lawyers and legal

historians.

This chapter otfers an analysis
of

Bicentennial Conference on the Constitution.

a

Here, my

attention is on the vocabulary of the
discourse and the
conference theme of "difference." The
conference,

entitled "Rights and Constitutionalism in
American
Life," was sponsored by the Department of
History of
the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and
The

Journal of American History

.

Employing textual

analysis of the conference papers,

I

show what these

scholars consider to be the important popular discourse
on the constitutional text.

While the legal profession

dominates constitutional interpretation, it has not
shut ail others out of the discussion.

The

pervasiveness ot popular American rights consciousness
which these scholars reveal is a little studied feature
of American legal and constitutional life.

Chapter Two builds on the conference by focusing
on an outgrowth of one of the conference papers.

One

.

of

the conferees,

labor lawyer and political
activist

Staunton Lynd, has put into
practice the theoretical
discussion of the rest of the
conference.
The case
study is qualitative textual
analysis of workers' and
communities' proselytizing tracts,
amici briefs,
journal articles, and newspaper
accounts of political
activity.
i
also interview the chief strategist,
Staunton Lynd in order to put
constitutional politics
in context.
This is a study of the use of
eminent
domain by communities as a mechanism to
realize their

claim of

a

constitutional right to industrial property.

The genesis of the idea of this constitutional
right
was born in the steel communities of
Youngstown, Ohio

and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

I

trace the fight

against corporate disinvestment within these two

communities as well as outside them where this

constitutional claim has surfaced.

The communities

which are pursuing this course against corporate

disinvestment are threatening to use their eminent
domain power to bring to bear their own constitutional
interpretation
Chapter Three examines the commonly held notion
that the Supreme Court has the final say on the

Constitution.

Franklin Roosevelt endorsed this view

when he urged Congress to pass his New Deal legislation
even with misgivings and "let the Supreme Court worry

«

about the constitutionality."-

William

0.

Douglas said,

At another time,

"The Court is really the

keeper of the conscience, and
the conscience

Constitution."-

is

the

Douglas- colleague, Robert Jackson,

also laid claim to the Court's
finality when he said in
QEQwp v. Al en , "[the Supreme Court]
is not

l

final

because we are infallible, but we are
infallible only
because we are final."
it is not just
the Court that

has this perception,

however.

When someone feels

injured in some measure, the commonest cry

is

"I'll

fight this all the way to the Supreme Court!"
In IMS y.

Chadha,** the Supreme Court declared the

legislative veto unconstitutional.

However, since that

decision was handed down in 1983, Congress has
incorporated 53 legislative vetoes into 18 pieces of

legislation at last count.

7

This fact of life in

Washington has to be taken account of

if we are to

know

the full picture of constitutional interpretive

Donald Grant Morgan, Congress and the
Constitution; A Study of Responsibility (Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1966), p. 15.
* a

Comment in an interview with Eric Sevareid.
Quoted in Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of
Itself (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986).
462, U.S.

*7

p

.

234

.

919

(1983).

See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues.

activity.

Chapter Three explores Congressuse of its
specially established law firms
to articulate
its own

interpretation of the separation
of powers doctrine.
The purest constitutional
interpretive practice
is, of course, the amendment
process.
As Judge Gibson
reminded us in EaHih v. Hanh," it
is the people who
have the ultimate say on the
Constitution.
Chapter
Four looks at what the people had
to say in Connecticut
when asked to call for a second
constitutional
convention. In periods of dissatisfaction
with Supreme
Court decisions or with congressional
acts there is a

resurgence of constitutional amendment politics.

Most

recently these politics have arisen over the
issue of
balanced budget amendment.

a

Unlike those involved in

the movement politics of community property rights,
the

activists here are usually elites.

Like their

forebears who wrote the original document, these

interpreters are comfortable wielding power and

therefore one might expect them to have the confidence
to take the document,
if

itself,

into their own hands and,

necessary, remold it at a second constitutional

convention.

This is the ultimate in constitutional

interpretive activity.

From the testimony taken in

Connecticut before that state's decision not to call
for a second constitutional convention, however, we can
48

12 Sergeant and Rawle

(Pa.S.Ct.) 330 (1825).

see that these elites are
fearful rather than confident
that the constitution could
be safely taken in hand
by
today's interpreters.
The politics in these four
chapters are emblematic
of the constitutional
interpretive activity of that

segment of the American polity that
defines its
politics by the Constitution. Together
they form much
of the larger picture of American
constitutional

interpretive practice that takes place
outside formal
legal institutions.
Ultimately, these constitutional
politics make significant contributions to
the syntax
of American constitutionalism.
However disparate

the

arenas, however disparate the actors, they
are all

bound together by a single document and

a

shared sense

that they all know what the language of that document

means.

What is of interest to us as political

scientists, however,

is

not so much the content of

their interpretations but that they all are

participating in constitutional interpretive activity.
This is the political activity that contributes to the

larger picture of American constitutional politics

which this dissertation examines.

CHAPTER

2

THE BICENTENENNIAL IN
THE ACADEMY

Nineteenth Century blacks,
women, and labor
activists held conventions,
gave speeches, wrote
pamphlets and each other
proclaiming their alternative
vision of the promise of the
Constitution.
In some

cases they were convincing
to us all (e.g., black
men
should have the vote), in other
cases only to each
other (e.g., the Constitution
already included women).
In every case, however, they
were involved in giving
definition to the document.
Scholars at a 20th Century
Bicentennial Conference re-examining
these views - both
those that won out and those that did
not - give new
voice to their vision.

Introduct ion
This chapter explores the kind of constitutional

consciousness suggested by Sotirios Barber

--

an

attitude of aspiration toward reaffirming the

Constitution's ways as one's best conception of the
good society.

Barber says that

This constitutional frame of mind is poorly
distributed and either cannot exist or cannot
generally be known to exist where genuine
reaffirmations of the Constitution are
replaced by a widespread acquiescence in the
imposition of some monopoly. Although we can
agree with what others say about the
Constitution, it is simply impossible for

.

someone to £ell_ us the
meaning of this law

The particular focus of
this chapter is a
bicentennial conference on the
Constitution.
The
conference also provides an
opportunity to take up
Richard Abel's challenge to
construct a new paradigm
for the study of law discussed
in the introduction.
Abel's call for new perspectives
reverberated
throughout the disciplines studying
law and society

especially loud in the year of the
Constitution's
Bicentennial.Constitutional study
that year

stimulated
Higher

a

self reflection.

Sflttfiatlaa ,

m

The chrnnin,

„f

constitutional scholars lamented the

dearth of fresh scholarship in response to
the

Bicentennial celebration
a

decade before through

3

a

When Project '87 was formed
joint effort of the American

Political Science Association and the American
Historical Association to promote the Bicentennial of
the Constitution, the goal for the project was to

stimulate serious new academic research on the
1

See Sotirios Barber, On What the Constitution
ea
M ,ns (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984), pp. 197-198.
2

See Stewart Macaulay, "Images of Law in
Everyday Life: The Lessons of School,
Entertainment, and Spectator Sports," Law and
Society Review 21 (1987):185.
3

See Karen Winkler, "Scholarship," The
Chronicle of High er Education. March 4, 1987.

Constitution and to improve public
understanding of its
history and place in contemporary
society.
According
to those attached to Project
'87, the latter
goal was

largely realized.

Where the project failed, however,

was in fostering the hoped-for
new scholarship.

Analysis of the impact of the
Constitution's

Bicentennial celebration was that

it was

making little

impression on research in the fields
where the
Constitution is most studied - history,

law and

political science.

*•

This desire for the Bicentennial to
generate new
and different scholarship was shared by
the historians
and academic lawyers who organized a
conference at the

University of Massachusetts at Amherst in the fall of
1986 to explore the social history of American

constitutionalism.

While the legal profession

dominates constitutional interpretation, others are
joined in the debate.

3

The pervasiveness of American

rights consciousness, which is evidence of this,

4

See generally Karen Winkler,

s

"Scholarship."

See Frank S. Lucash, ed , Justice and
Equalit y Here and Now (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1986); Judith Baer, Equality Under the
Constitution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983); Roland J. Pennock and John W. Chapman,
Constitutionalism (New York: New York University
Press, 1979).
.

is a

.

little studied feature
of American leg al and
constitutional life which was
addressed at the
conference

Sponsored by the Department
of History at the
University of Massachusetts
in conjunction with
TJ^

Jovial

of

frn e rl

r

m

Hist or y (which devoted its December

1987 issue to these conference
papers), the conference
took the title "Constitutionalism
in American Life."

Thirteen historians and legal
scholars gathered to
explore the general theme of
constitutionalism as well
as relationships between group
identity and

constitutional history.

questions as

a

This chapter addresses several

way of placing the Bicentennial

Conference in the context of American
interpretive
practice.

When they spoke of constitutionalism, to

what did they refer?

Where did they look for evidence

of popular rights consciousness?

Did they break out of

the traditional structure for constitutional analysis
(i.e.,

judicial doctrine)?

In employing textual

analysis of the conference papers, one can mark the

concepts informing the constitutional discourse taking
place outside formal legal institutions, as well as the

activity that discourse inspires.

.

From conversations with
the conference
organizers,* it was clear that
their vision for the
conference was that it produce
scholarship different
from the conventional practice
of constitutional
history which has failed to
account
for the

pervasiveness of American rights
consciousness in the
face of legal positivism.
Therefore, they looked
for

evidence of constitutional consciousness
and practice
outside the context of ahistorical
doctrinal analysis
and beyond the development of the
institutions

born of

the document.

The conference was broken into two
symposia.

Symposium

I

approached constitutionalism from the

perspective of the impact of the Constitution on
American development over 200 years in each of
four
areas: economic life, politics and government, race

relations, and diplomacy.

Symposium

I,

with its more

traditional approach to constitutional history,

addressed directly in this paper.

It is significant,

however, that the organizers of Symposium
set it apart from Symposium

6

I

is not

in order

II

chose to

to emphasize

Hendrick Hartog, University of Wisconsin Law
School, Madison and Robert Griffin, Chairman,
Department of History, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst

that their conception
of constitutionalism
and

constitutional scholarship
was different.
Where one symposium
painted American
constitutional history in broad
strokes emphasizing
main themes that explained
institutional, economic,
race and international
relations vis a vis the
Constitution, the second looked
to the minutiae of
social history to reveal
American constitutional
culture.
in the organizers' words,
"The purpose of the
symposium would be to explore some
relationships
between group identity and
constitutional discourse and
debate through the course of American
national
history".- The organizers of this
symposium held the

view that not only have perceived
understandings of
constitutional entitlements and disabilities

shaped

group identities, but public understandings
of what the
Constitution guarantees have been changed
fundamentally
by the participation of diverse social
groups.

In

other words, not only have rights activists taken
cues

from judicial opinions, their activity, as well,
informs our common sense of what the Constitution

7

Conference announcement.

means.

Furthermore, there is evidence
that popular
constitute politics influences
U.S. Supreme Court
opinions a

The claim of conference
organizers that their
scholarly endeavor is different
from traditional

constitutional scholarship with
its attention on
doctrinal development is one
measure I apply to the
conference.

Specifically,

I

consider what it means

that a new (different) perspective
on the Constitution
is

being offered.

What,

if anything,

in these papers

different from other research on the
Constitution?
Part of the claim to difference is
rooted in an
is

additional aspiration of the organizers
to use the
conference for "vocabulary building." I,
therefore,
also look for evidence of that effort.
The conference
offers its analysis of American political
culture

surrounding the Constitution and, at the same time,
forms a piece of that culture itself.

This is

especially true since the organizers aspired both to
explicate ideas already held, but obscured to us, as
well as to influence the structure and content of

further thought on the Constitution.

a

See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, "The ERA and
the U.S. Supreme Court," Research in Law and Policy
Studies 1 (1987) :1
.

While the conference
papers can certainly stand
on
their own, they are of
most interest when taken
as a
whole.
it is their combined
purpose that tells us
about the Constitution in
the academy.
The organizers
of the conference did
not want to leave it to
chance
that their view of
constitutionalism as rights
consciousness would be addressed
in an undirected call
for papers.
Consequently, they sought out
scholars
whom they knew to be involved in
work on rights
consciousness and the social history
of the American
Constitution.
The result of this deliberate

organization
of

is

its parts.

an endeavor that is larger than
the sum

What we learn from each paper

enhanced by the order in which it

is

is given as well as

by its being one of several bricks in

a

scholarly

edifice of constitutionalism as rights consciousness.
This method of organization is itself unusual.
it

is not remarkable that specific scholars
be

to participate,

it

is

clearly

a

While
invited

different enterprise

when a gathering is organized around

a

papers rather than as this one was.

In the latter

general call for

event, both the content of the papers and the

orchestration of the conference claims our attention
because both tell us something about current American

constitutional scholarship.

35
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Rice University historian
Thomas Haskell,* laid
the foundation for
legitimating the activity of
the
conference itself.
His paper opened the
discussion
with an exploration of
competing views
in

jurisprudence.

He posed natural rights
philosophy

which holds that law can
and should be deduced from
the
higher principles of the
laws of nature against the
Nietzschean view, or historicism,
which denies the
possibility of establishing any
such transh istor ical
and transcultural standard.
Haskell's purpose was not
to resolve this debate, but
to show the ground in
between where a debate on rights
can stand.-

That is,

he sought to expose the territory
between two competing

views where the discourse of rights

is

in

fact taking

place and where that discourse makes
sense to us even
in the absence of a consensus on
natural law

philosophy.

Haskell grants histor icism' s claim that

rights are social conventions.

This does not, however,

9

See Thomas L. Haskell, "The Paradoxical
Persistence of Rights Talk in the Age of
Interpretation, » Paper presented at The Journal
of American History Conference at Amherst,
Massachusetts November 7-8, 1986.
x

1

10

For another attempt to map the ground
between ideologies in the search for justice see
Richard Rorty, Contingency. Irony & Solidarity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
.

mean when we understand
rights in this way that we
do
not have substantial
knowledge.
He asserts, "By
mapping more precisely the
pale beyond which morality
is irredeemably historical,
we do of course concede
some territory to the cr iter
ionless wilderness.... But
we also demarcate the zone
within which rights and
other claims to objective moral
knowledge can enjoy
something like 'universal' sway....
[And this] is also
all we need" 11
.

Haskell is saying we do not need to
have

a

conception be "true to an order antecedent
to and given
to us" in order to justify it.
He offers a territory
between Reason and History where we can root
our

conceptions of justice, rights, and equality.

territory

is

conventions.

This

described by persisting social
These conventions, however, are open to

rational criticism and are flexible in response to

changing technology.

Haskell opens his conception of

"technology" to include events like the post-1750

Western movement toward humani tar ianism.

This,

according to Haskell, came about not because the Golden
Rule was unknown before but because what was conceived
of as natural and unchangeable came to have new

meaning.
11

What before had been seen as not available to

See Thomas L. Haskell, "The Paradoxical
Persistence of Rights talk in the *Age of
Interpretation,'" p. 34.

human intervention came to be
within the power of
humans to affect.
Thus, a change in technology
(the
power to help others) precipitated
a change in the
conventional conceptions of how one
treats one's fellow
humans.
in giving to the meaning
of rights the concept
"social conventions" Haskell suggests
where
we fall off

the track in our attempts to give
meaning to other

concepts.

We think we must limit our
choice to one of

two extremes

-

Reason

&

Natural Law or

Interpretivism/Historicism.

We live,

however,

in

between and it is there that we should look
for meaning
in our discourse.

Conference case studies in women's, blacks',
workers' and the family's perceptions of and

mobilization around rights issues looked for that
meaning.

Women, blacks and workers comprise groups

that pursued formal legal recognition of their rights
as well as developed within this activity their own

conceptions of what rights, constitutionalism, and
justice mean.

They and their activity

is

of interest

not simply because they claimed to have rights but

because they worked to influence the meaning society as
a

whole gave to these rights claims.

Their sense of

what the Constitution means came from within themselves
and from the debates they held, not just from positive
law.

This is emblematic of James Boyd White's

"interpretation as action.

»"

m

Cerfcainiv
certainly,
these groups

acceded to the authority of
the courts but that is
different from saying they
embraced the interpretation
the courts put on the
Constitution.

Inviting papers

dealing with women, blacks,
workers and the family, the
conference organizers showed that
constitutionalism
defined as rights consciousness
permeates society.
This reinforces the conference
claim that
constitutional practice
the courts alone;

is

not the special province of

that important aspects of

constitutional meaning can be found in
doctrinal
analysis but the full flowering of the
Constitution
takes place in social discourse.
Social historian Ellen DuBois 13 of the State

University of New York at Buffalo echoed Haskell's
theme of the conventional nature of rights.

claim

is

Again the

made that rights must be understood in their

historical setting in order to make full sense of them
and. so that we are not

drawn into the misconception

that previous ideas about rights are rooted in Nature
12

See James Boyd White, When Words Lose
Their Meaning;
Constitu tions and Reconst itutions
of Language. C haracter, and Community (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
13

See Ellen Dubois, "Girls Just Want to
Have Rights:
Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage and the
U.S. Constitution, 1820-1875," paper presented at
The Journal of American History Conference at
Amherst, Massachusetts November 7-8, 1986.

or Reason rather
than
of

in the

conventions and politics

their time.

DuBois' contribution is
to trace the
development of the demand
for political equality
for

women through nineteenth
century feminist debates.
Her
case study peels back the
top layer of the women's
rights struggle (the results)
and exposes the politics
and circumstances affecting
and shaping the womensuffrage movement. DuBois shows
that the ultimate
triumph in the 19th Amendment
was not the original aim
of the earliest women's
rights activists.
By
the end

of the original women's
rights struggle,

be claims against the state,

rights came to

negative force against

a

governmental power centered in the call
for

constitutional amendment.

Early on, however, women saw

rights as positive guides for

already inherent

in a

a

a

benign government

constitution that did not require

amendment to include women.

Early feminists called

upon women to assert the rights already there.

DuBois

sets straight the historical record to show how

conceptions of rights come from social debate (the
struggle for the ascendant idea) by recapturing the
specifics of that debate.
The claim that her research is different comes

from where she looks to find the discourse of rights.

Scholarship that focuses on formal convention reports
and judicial doctrine leaves the impression that the

way an age or culture
understands itself is in one
coherent voice. Those
historical artifacts, however,
reveal more about the
politics than the social
history
and culture of their
time.
This Bicentennial
Conference called our
attention to the discourse
brought to the women's
rights conventions
and the

struggle that took place
there rather than the
judgments or compromises that
came out of those
conventions.
if rignts are inve£Jted
conventional
meaning that, while flexible,
is still rooted in past
conventional understanding, then
it is important to be
fully clear about what that past
understanding

^

was.

it

is meaningful in today's
struggle to know that a view

resonates with the past even if it
were a past view
that failed to carry its own day.
The question that remains, however,
is how to
recapture that full discourse. For the
participants in
this conference, the answer is to look
at the whole
field of ideas surrounding the Constitution
that were
taken seriously in their own day. Our culture
and

social conventions are formed not only by the
ideas or

compromises that win out, but also by those that do not
gain ascendancy and by the tensions in between. x «
The classic work depicting the arguments of
the losing side is Herbert J. Storing's account of
the arguments against the U.S. Constitution
promulgated in 1787. See Herbert J. Storing, What
the Anti-Federalists were
r (Chicago and London:

m

In a

postscript, DuBois recalled
two speeches made at
the
1878 woman Suffrage Convention
that, in contrast with
each other, show the range
of the rights discourse
within the women's movement.
Her reading of nineteenth
century feminism is that many
did not see rights as
narrowed to a principle for
prohibiting government
action.
The politics that led feminists
to the
strategy of a woman's suffrage
amendment have obscured
their other discourse on rights,
equally important to
their day and ours, that sees
rights as inherent, not
given, and as a positive guide
for government.

Columbia University historian Eric
Foner 's"
research on 19th century blacks confirms

DuBois' claim

of a common sense of rights as
positive guides for

government rather than a negative claim
against
government.

Foner, too, looked at convention speeches

as well as private letters of newly freed
blacks to

show that their conception of freedom was rooted
in
their sense that participation in politics
to which

—

they had a right

—

was their best protection.

The

Declaration of Independence and, after the 14th
Amendment, the Constitution made their claims to

University of Chicago Press, 1981).
XB

See Eric Foner, "Rights and the
Constitution in Black Life During the Civil War and
Reconstruction," paper presented at The Journal of
American History Conference at Amherst
Massachusetts, November 7-8, 1986.

political equality with the
white man meaningful. By
looking at the record they
left in their private
letters and Reconstruction
Convention speeches, Foner
uncovered the popular
constitutional consciousness
of

19th century blacks.

while blacks failed to impose on

the rest of society their
interpretation of
constitutional protections as issues
of federalism and
racism surfaced, they nevertheless
formed their own
constitutional conceptions and tried
to foster their
ideas in others.
The conference shows that there was
ongoing popular discussion of the meaning
given to the
Constitution in the 19th century and that,
while

political expediency swept aside these
discussions at
the time, they left a legacy of
popular constitutional consciousness and conceptions
of

rights that continues to be called on today.
This Bicentennial Conference's view of

constitutional politics as a positive force assumes
that law is a logical and fertile arena within which to

bring about needed social change.
problematic.

This is, of course,

As discussed in the introduction, Richard

Able objects to this wholly positive view because, with
its focus on law and social change, it "distracts

attention from law and social stasis". 16

"

This concern

See Richard L. Abel, "Redirecting Social
Studies of Law," Law and Society Review 14
(1980) :805.

was shared by University
of North Carolina
historian
Leon Pink as he raised
the issues of f a i se
consciousness and cooptation
in relation to
constitutional activism."
Kink also looked to private
papers and convention speeches
as well as union
pamphlets to reveal labor's
historical perception of
the Constitution.

From the beginning of the labor
movement, workers'
public self-definition has been
shaped by
legal and

constitutional principles.

The problem in this for

workers, according to Fink, is that
their commitment to
work within the framework of American
laws and economic
institutions has meant that they have
had to contend
with definitions of their activity made
on
others'

terms.

Even so, however, workers did share the
vision

of women and blacks that even if the
courts could not

see it, the Constitution did speak to them
and their
needs.

Their special problem was translating the

Constitution into the language of collective rather
than individual rights.

It is at this intersection

that DuBois' attention to a vision of rights as a

positive force for the welfare of the community as a

X-7

See Leon Fink, "Labor, Liberty, and the
Law: Trade unionism and the problem of Collective
Action Within the American Constitutional Order,"
paper presented at The Journal of American History
Conference at Amherst, Massachusetts, November 7-8.
1986.

whole becomes especially
important to workers'
claims
that collective action
was within the spirit
of the
Constitution. Having a
problem different from that
of
women and blacks, however,
workers pursued a different
legislative and legal strategy
which left them
at the

mercy of conservative
courts for the definition
of both
their rights and their
activity.
Concentrating on the Samuel
Gompers era in the
history of the American Federation

of Labor (AFL), Fink

drew a distinction between early
labor history and that
of the "Gilded Age."
Artisanal republicanism
had

greatly helped to get the Constitution
ratified but as
the legal institutions came to be
controlled by
employers, law and the legal system
took on an entirely
different meaning for American workers.
The

Constitution was no longer their shield but
rather the
weapon of the capitalist. Looking at the
convention
speeches and union pamphlets to map this
change
in the

constitutional consciousness of American labor,
Fink
showed American labor's frustration with judicial
"reinterpretation" of the Constitution.

The

interpretation they themselves gave the document,
evident in their speeches and pamphlets, imported to
the Constitution a sense of rights that embraced and

protected collective action.

Labor could neither

persuade the courts to their view, however, nor leave

aside constitutional
activity.

Labor

p lnk . a examination of

constitutional discourse reveals
the American
labor movement long puzzling
over how to take advantage
of the law and the
opportunities available through
the
political structure.
>.

Like workers and the
Constitution, the family and
the Constitution has problematic
connections, what is
most interesting about Harvard
law professor Martha
Minow's conference paper,noweverr ig
nQt the

connections she shows but what she
reveals in the
skeleton of her scholarship on the
topic,

m

a

prefatory note, Minow explained that she
had done
little actual research on her topic
because

she had

devoted most of her time to "shaping a
sensible set of
questions connecting family and the themes
of this

•

conference.""

Consequently, hers is a real "working

paper" and allows us the greatest insight into
the

attempt to bring a different perspective to the study
of American constitutionalism.

Minow was not sure it

made sense to include the family in those groups that

la

See Martha Minow, "Rights Consciousness
and American Families," paper presented at The
Journal of Ameri can History Conference at Amherst,
Massachusetts, November 7-8,1986.
1B See Martha Minow,
American Families," p. 1.

"Rights Consciousness and

made their claims and
drew their identity from
legal
institutions. Consequently,
she approached her task
for the conference
hesitatingly.
in laying out her concerns
and questions

explicitly, she cast in sharpest
relief the themes and
purposes of the conference.
Where are rights located
in the family?

m

should answer this?
family, itself?

the individual?

Courts?

The group?

who

Political activists?

The

she wondered how to dig
beneath legal

texts for lay consciousness
about the meanings of
rights and for contrasting sources
of meanings about
rights.
This shows us two things. First
of all it
shows that the challenge to historians
and academic
lawyers to find popular constitutional
consciousness is
a sensible task, but not an easy
one.
in addition,

Minow's being at first stumped as to where
her sources
lie lends credence to the claim that this
scholarship
is indeed different for at least some of
the

participants.
Ultimately, Minow strained to fit her

understanding of law and the family into the
conference's theme of rights consciousness.

In fact,

she concluded, "Rights consciousness is an intriguing
but problematic lens through which to re-examine the

history of the family.... ...

she commented eariier

that there is more evidence
of the metaphor of
-familyin rights discourse
(fraternity, sisterhood,
community)
than there are rights
metaphors in the discourse
on the
family where the language is
more that of "duty- than
"rights.
Minow-s conclusion that the
American family
has not articulated a
self-conscious constitutionalism
leads to other issues. What
was clear to Minnow was
"that dimension of rights
consciousness and the family
that concerns the popular conception
of the family as
the locus for children's learning
including their
learning about rights
addition to learning
about rights, however, 19th century
children were to
learn from the family environment a respect

—

-

,

m

for

authority and self-restraint.

Rather than showing the

development of a rights consciousness, Minow's
research
on the family shows some of the tensions within
the

larger constitutional system.

there are duties.

In addition to rights,

In addition to the individual, there

is the family or community.

Interests, needs and

rights overlap here.
The conference's four case studies revealed not
just the fullness of the spectrum of constitutional
20

See Martha Minow, "Rights Consciousness
and American Families, - p. 31.
2X See Martha Minow, -Rights
Consciousness and
American Families," p. 31.

consciousness in American
life out the tensions
within
it as well.
Fink was especially ood
at capturing the
g
dilemma of integrating
individual and collective
rights
claims. What happens to
the individual when she
is
subsumed within the union or
the family? There are
multiple loci of rights which
surface most clearly in
labor's discourse of rights.
Fink's study shows that
workers have, themselves, been
ambivalent about where
they wanted their rights to
lie.
This ambivalence has
persisted into contemporary labor
history.

Historian and lawyer, Staunton Lynd"
brought
labor's historical struggle with
constitutionalism into
the present with his study of a
steelworker
union

local's attempt to save jobs through
appeal to

constitutional rights (detailed in Chapter Two).

Here

was constitutional rights consciousness
at work within
the conference's model. Lynd's study,
using public

speeches, union newsletters, and pamphlets,
documented
the genesis of a new constitutional claim
formulated

and promulgated outside legal institutions.

In Lynd's

words, "What one saw in Youngstown and Pittsburgh

during the decade considered in this study was a

community of worker-intellectuals doggedly pursuing the
a2

See Staunton Lynd, "The Genesis of the
Idea of a Community Right to Industrial Property in
Youngstown and Pittsburg, 1977-86," paper presented
at The Journal of American History Conference at
Amherst, Massachusetts, November 7-8, 1986.

idea of a community
right in industrial
property, step
by pragmatic step, arriving
at proposals fully as
radical as any previously
proposed, yet framing

them democratically, and
in the American grain,
in such
a way as to bring others
along with them.""
The success Lynd claimed
for the project was a
limited one. A lack of adequate
financial reso,>urces
deprived the workers of realization
of their
constitutional claim. For the
conference's purposes,
however, the steelworkers union
was hugely successful.
Their experience showed what it
is like to tap a
constitutional consciousness. Furthermore,
'

it

confirmed Haskell's thesis that we can
call on our
understanding of social conventions rather
than natural
law to give authority to our rights
claims. Lynd said
the steelworkers' local was successful
at least in

setting the terms of the debate because the
workers
framed the discourse of rights "in the American
grain."
The workers' claim of a constitutional right's
being

involved in their struggle was successful because it

resonated with middle-America's sense of what the

Constitution promises.
What is especially interesting about the

steelworkers' success is that the Pittsburgh/Youngstown

"

See Staunton Lynd, "The Genesis of the Idea
of a Community Right to Industrial Property in
Youngstown and Pittsburg, 1977-86," p. 47-48.

community accepted the
steeiworker local's
constitutional interpretation
interDrPt-^inn in spite
of its formal
rejection by a court.
implicit
-

in popular

constitutional activity is
the idea of multiple
constitutional authorities.
if the courts were the
only recognized authority
on the Constitution,
rights
activists would devote themselves
to talking only to
judges and lawyers instead of
to each
other and the

public-

m

her paper, University of
Connecticut law
professor Carol Weisbrod showed
how religious groups

have historically successfully
competed for authority
over the meaning of the Constitution."
Weisbrod's
thesis is that the Constitution as
an institution has
to some degree recognized multiple
authorities and to

some degree made room for them.

The tensions between

the claims of families and communities
and individuals

tell us something about the place for
multiple

authorities in the American constitutional order.
Weisbrod recalled that from our earliest moments
as a
people, the church has competed with the state for
»* See Louis Fi sher, Constitutional Dialogue
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1988) for an excellent explication of both the
normative and empirical argument against the
Supreme Court as the ultimate interpreter.
2a

See Carol Weisbrod, "Family, Church and
State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious
Authority," paper presented at The Journal of
American History Conference at Amherst,
Massachusetts November 7-8, 1986.

.

authority over various
aspects of our lives. This
is
especially obvious in the
area of family law. The
history of religious groups'
struggles to define 1st
Amendment religious claims
on their

own terms shows a

competition among these groups,
themselves, over
whether the amendment should
be understood to mean the
state is to leave the church
alone in its recognized
sphere or whether it is to
recognize the church's and
the state's overlapping
concerns and authority.
it is

part of our constitutional
practice, then, to submit to
the courts but our sense of
what the Constitution means
to us as individuals or as
members of groups can and

does come from other sources as well.

Weisbrod's study

showed not only the fact of this but
also that the
American constitutional system has accommodated
this
fact

Part of the orchestration of the conference

included inviting Georgetown University Law Center
legal scholar, Mark Tushnet, to offer a counter
view.

While Tushnet was not as negative or critical as he was

expected to be, 2e he nevertheless presented a different

view of the nature and consequences of constitutional
consciousness.

Tushnet saw the ambiguity and open

texture of the Constitution as problematic for rights20 From author's conversation
with Hendrick
Hartog of the University of Wisconsin Law School,
October 23, 1986.

conscious groU ps rather
than as a broad foundation
on
which to stake claims.
He came to this conclusion
after researching the
point in the NAACP's history
when
W.E.B. DuBois resigned from
that organization
over his

differing view of the strategy
blacks should pursue to
gain full equality. Tushnet
saw the struggle of those
who tried to give content to
the constitutional concept
of equality as divisive
and distracting.
He said, "The

Constitution provided a framework
within which
political alliances could form, but
its ambiguities
meant that alliances formed to
achieve equality might
fragment when some participants found
it necessary to
specify more precisely what they meant
2
by
equality".

''

Rather than seeing constitutional
consciousness as the
tie that binds, Tushnet saw skillful
political action
as holding alliances together and, consequently,
did

not see a difference between a constitutional
and a

political commitment to equality.

To Tushnet, the

Constitution seems more of a hindrance than a help when
it comes to achieving rights.

27
See Mark Tushnet, "The Politics of
Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal
Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles
Hamilton Houston, " paper presented at The Journal
of American History Conference at Amherst,
Massachusetts November 7-8, 1986.

Conclu.S

i

nr.

The Conference
articulated multiple themes
and was
not as coherent as this
research may suggest.
One of
the organizers had hoped
that the conference would
be
an opportunity to do
some vocabulary building
but he
did not see much of that
taking place.- what he had
in mind when he spoke
of vocabulary building
is not
clear but it appears that
the conference implicitly,
if
not explicitly, defined its
own terms, it defined

constitutionalism as rights consciousness
when
separated one symposia from the other

it

and invited

participants to the second symposium
who spoke of
constitutionalism only in terms of rights.

Further,

the conference defined rights as
social conventions.

This can be inferred from the fact
that no debate

emerged in the conference about what rights
are.

In

addition, Haskell's model of rights discourse
rooted in
the "in between territory where we live"
was implicitly
taken on by all participants.
The effort to be "different" was an important
issue for the conference.

Its goal was to generate

scholarship that looked in places other than courts for
the discourse on rights.

Minow posed the question

2S Conversation
with Hendrick Hartog,
14,

1986.

November

explicitly when she asked
if conceptions of
the home as
the castle in popular
literature are more telling
statements of rights consciousness
than the legal

doctrines.

she also asked how clients
in lawsuits felt
about the way lawyers framed
their suits asserting
rights claims. These questions,
as well as others,

stimulate new thinking about the
Constitution.
They
point us to new sources for
understanding American' s
rights consciousness.

in addition, the conference'
s

way ot looking at popular
constitutional consciousnes s
was different from a gap study.
The

conference was not

interested in comparing popular and
formal legal
constitutional thought.
it offered the social history
of popular constitutional discourse
as constitutional
activity itself with a life and legitimacy
of its own

whether or not it echoed that of the Supreme
Court.
Furthermore, the conference, itself, is an example
of American constitutional rights consciousness.

It

documented some of the history of American
constitutional culture as it formed a new piece of it.
By looking at the event of the conference as well as
its content, we can see significant features of

constitutional interpretive practice overlooked in
traditional American constitutional scholarship.

.

.

CHAPTER

.

3

THE COMMUNITY ON THE
CONSTITUTION
EMINENT DOMAIN AND
CORPORATE DISINVESTMENT

Faced with plant closings
and the loss of Jobs
after years in the
factory or mill, steelworks
in
Youngstown, Ohio and
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and
toolmaxers in New Bedford,
Massachusetts claim their
property is being taken when
corporations disinvest.
They believe they have a
constitutional property right
to participate in business
decisions that affect them.
Furthermore, they believe their
community's power of
eminent domain provides them
with the mechanism with
which to exercise this right.
This chapter explores
the political and legal
practices that these ideas have
generated

Myths of Righ ts

-

Myths of Chang e

When Stuart Scheingold explored the
politics of
rights a dozen or so years ago, he
suggested a standard
by which to judge the efficacy of the
law as an

instrument for social change.

In Scheingold's opinion,

"If litigation can play a redistr ibutive
role,

be useful as an agent of change.

If not,

utility must be heavily discounted." 1

it can

its political

He showed that

litigation can generate rather than resolve social
1
See Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Rights
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

conflict and therefore

»

[t ]he

direct linking of rights

remedies, and change that
characterizes the
^His must... be exchanged for a more complex
framework, the
which takes into
account the contingent
character of rights in the
American system..- The legal
and political activity
recounted in this chapter
constitute attempts to
exchange the myth of rights
for the politics of rights.
The myth is overcome when
social activists

nfc^,

look to the

courts as means not ends and
attempt to maintain their
struggle as a fundamentally
political rather than legal
one.
To do this, political strategists
of movement
politics must define the terms and
issues of the debate
rather than allow lawyers to do so.
in the cases

discussed here, this means that rather
than seeking to
have a court tell a corporation planning
to relocate
that it cannot move because of that court's

interpretation of the Constitution, the community
itself, by invoking eminent domain asserts
its own

sense of a constitutional right to industrial
property.

Eminent domain, even though
aura to it.

2

p

.

7

.

a

legal tool, has a popular

Courts are extremely deferential to the

See Stuart Scheingold, The Politi cs of Rights

,

57
a

legal mechanise for
realizing constitutional
claims
that rest primarily
ln

^^

fch ,

courts and judges.
MY interest in studying
some o£ these
struggles is not in
predicting the ultimate

building

outcome in

new constitutional
consensus but rather i„
showing where and how
this political activity
is taking
Place.
rn
the folloHlng
a

t

based on

a

politics of rights that have
been launched
against corporate disinvestment.

D isinvestment.

The Gan
afciinUaPi
Community Property

and

Corporate disinvestment, put in
its crudest form,
milks profits from a stable
subsidiary
in order to

expand a conglomerate's overall
holdings.

The problem

for the subsidiary company
is that the profits syphoned
off by the conglomerate are
part of the capital

necessary for its own upgrading and
expansion.
Ultimately, the subsidiary company
choices:

*

(

19 54

112
)

.

left with a few

to pressure its workers for wage
concessions,

to move to a cheaper labor market,

U.S.

is

or to leave the

See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Rr Hi»
?
Y|
(1896) and Berman v. Parker. 348 U.S. 28

i

64

industry altogether and
exploit the plant's real
estate
value.
However, these are not the
only reasons for
closing plants.
When management first began
closing plants,
company spokespersons as well
as analysts in the press,
attributed the shutdowns to the
unfair competition of
foreign subsidized firms,
excessive wage demands from
organized labor, and unreasonable
Environmental
Protection Agency standards which
raise costs and lower
efficiency, all explanations that
excused management
from any responsibilities.
These reasons began to ring
hollow, however, as companies chose
to close plants
that were profitable.
This has been most persuasively

described by Bennett Harrison and Barry
Bluestone.*
Their economic analysis of the corporate
practice of

disinvestment has radicalized workers and communities.
In the post-New Deal socioeconomic order,

3

there has

been a consensus between management and labor
that
labor's wages will be dictated by profit and in
return,
as long as there is a profit, there will be jobs.

When

corporations disinvest from profitable industries, they
are breaking this unwritten rule.

Thus workers and

*
See Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, The
Deindustr ializa tion of America (New York: Basic Books,

1982).
See Gilda Haas, Plant Closures:
Myths,
Realities and R esponses (Boston: South End Press,
Pamphlet No. 3, 1985)
.
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is,

nevertheless, a
radical move for
workers to try to have
a say i
owners' decisions
about property.
In opposl|ng
disinvestment, workers are
extendi™
extending the concept of
property ownership to
include workers' and
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investment in industrial
property as social and
economic externalities
k .,
nanties. .They
believe this investment
entitles them to participate
in decisions about
the
ultimate fate of industrial
property in their
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communities

Testing the Mettle nf rho
steelworks.
Over the past dozen years,

labor lawyer and

political activist, Staunton
Lynd has documented the
story of steelworker locals'
struggles to save jobs

through
based on

campaign against corporate
disinvestment

a
a

politics of rights.

His work is of interest

both because of his argument
for

a

community property

right and because of the language
and political style
he uses to make his case.
While he can speak as a lawyer, scholar,
political

theorist, or urban planner, Lynd's target
audience is

ordinary people and theirs

is

the language he uses.
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try to even up the odds
the Y
to
story to

-

The story he tells is an
old one but the analysis he
brings to it and the solution
he offers are new.

According to Lynd, the first step
in solving
problem is to determine its root
causes.

a

When American

conglomerates began shutting down plants
in the Steel
Belt in the late 1970's, workers at
first simply
accepted management's explanations that
the dumping of
subsidized foreign steel in American markets
forced

managers to close the plants.

According to Lynd, this

willingness of steelworkers to accept the owners'
business decisions came to an end when they saw

profitable plants being closed not only by diversified
corporations but also by traditional steel companies.

7

At this point, union and community leaders sought
other

explanations, stopped blaming themselves, and developed
e

See Staunton Lynd, "Towards A Not-For-Prof it
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition
and Use of Industrial Property," Harvard Civil RiahtsCivil Liberties aw Review 27 1987 ): 1
r,

7

(

.

See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against Shutdowns
(San Pedro: Singlejack Books, 1982).

new strategies to hold
the corporations
accountable to
the communities where
they operated."
In Lynd s words
"The collapse of the
steel industry in
Youngstown,
Pittsburgh and other
communities of the industrial
heartland disrupted the
implicit social contract
that
had existed in these
towns for a generation.Workers
were no longer willing
simply to accept owners'
,

decisions.

Lynd's contribution to
the struggle against
Plant shutdowns is to tell
the Youngstown/Pi ttsburgh
steel story in numerous
forums to make the claim
of a
community property right
meaningful in a liberal
political culture which values
individualism
and

individual property rights. 10
The steelworkers- response to
the economic
disaster of closing profitable plants
(albeit not

profitable enough for the parent company)
was not
resignation to bad fortune but a deep sense
of

betrayal.

"Inarticulate assumptions about the

a

See generally Gilda Haas, Plant
glflgJlEfigj
HYthS, Realities and Rgspon^ and sta unton Lynd,
The
y
Lns'
Fight Against shntrin Wn g
,

9

p

.

lb.

See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against

10

shnHo^,

American political thought was not always
rooted in individualism. Jefferson's republicanism
posited a rule of law that served the greater good of
the community rather than the individual.
For an
analysis of the theoretical development that culminated
in liberalism see "Notes," The Yale
aw Journal 94
(1985) :694-716.
r.

connection of the companies
With the communities they
dominated were brought to
the surface, examined
and
discussed. An area that
had symbolized toughness
and
unreflective patriotism ...
became the incubator of
new
ideas about the rights
of communities to
industrial
property".
As Lyn d describes it,
for generations
People in the steel region of
Ohio and Pennsylvania had
put down roots and devoted
themselves, body and soul,
to making steel.
This meant instilling the
value of

»

unquestioning loyalty to authority;
of accepting wide
economic inequality and the
political inequality that
results; of accepting the
transformation of the
institutions traditionally organized
to serve the
individual into institutions that
serve the industry
the church, local and state
governments.

-

Perhaps,

most importantly this meant raising
children to want to
go into the steel mill rather than to
go
away.

The

interests and demands of the industry obscured
the

individual's own interests.

An early sociologist of

American labor, Margaret F. Byington, in detailing
life
in the Pittsburgh steel community of
Homestead at the

turn of the century wrote that
[The steel town's men may be too worn by the
stress of the twelve-hour shifts to care for
their own individual development or too shorn
J

1X

See Staunton Lynd, "Towards a Not-For-Prof it
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition
and Use of Industrial Property," p. 17.

commercial necessit-v

t-h =

;

society nor

These are the cultural
roots of Lynd's community.
Steel was an integral part
of the economic life
of the
entire Monongahela Valley
and of the neighboring
communities.
For generations individual
and community
identity was tied to the
production of
steel.

As the

national and international
economy changed in the early
1970 's, this economic bond
came to an end.

Although the communities and
workers could still
earn a living from the steel
industry,
as Lynd

explains, both old and new industry
owners saw that
their desire for higher marginal
profitability could be
pursued better in other locations and,
in some cases,

in other

industries.

Even after the owners had come to

these conclusions, however, they continued
to encourage
the workers in these communities to order
their lives

around the belief that steel was there to stay.

When

the workers came to realize the difference
between the

owners' private plans and public sentiments, they felt

doubly betrayed:

the companies had asked for and been

See Margaret F. Byington, Homestead: Th*
Households of a Mill Town (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1974), p. 184.

.

given concessions to
increase profitability
with the
usually lmp i icit , and
sometimes expllcitj pro[n
se Q£
continued operation.
.

in the Pittsburgh/Youngstown
area,

coalition of
religious, labor and community
leaders calling
themselves the Tri-state
Conference on steel appealed
to the workers' sense
that they had been betrayed
to
make the concept of a community
property right
meaningful.
Their first attempt at assessing
obligations and rights in what
had previously been
discussed only in economic terms
was to write a
"pastoral letter- that, coming from
the community's
moral leaders not only carried extra
authority, but
also elevated the struggle above
narrow political or
economic interests. The religious
leaders in the
a

coalition were from the upper echelons
of the churches.
The original Ecumenical Coalition was
created
by a

Roman Catholic Bishop, an Episcopal Bishop,
and

Presbyterian minister.

a

In their pastoral letter,

they

argued that

Industrial investment decisions ought to take
into account the needs and desires of
employees and the community at large
Human beings and community life are higher
values than corporate profits. 13

13 See Staunton
Lynd,
p.
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This statement was
the beginning

of a

new conception

o£

a

constitutional community
property right.
A sense of betrayal
does not necessarily
inspire a
community to pursue a
constitutional claim, of course
Workers in youngstown, in
fact, first decided that
there had been a breach
of contract secured
by an
"invisible handshake." They
unsuccessfully pursued
this legal claim through
conventional litigation.In

Lynd's view, however, it was
their sense of betrayal
that lead them to reexamine
their ideas.
Ultimately,
they concluded that what
constitutes the general
welfare itself goes beyond
business principles.
The
pastoral letter is an expression
of this sentiment.
in
the words of the pastoral letter,
"economic decisions
ought not to be left to the judgment
of a few persons
with economic power, but should
be shared with the
larger community which is affected
by
the decisions.""

Steel had provided work for the community
but the

community had provided the atmosphere and
local economy
that attracted and sustained the necessary
workforce as
well as the infrastructure that industry
needs,

communities commonly contribute externalities to lure
1

-4

United Steel Workers of Ame r ica. Local 1330 et
Corporation. 492 F.
Sudd 1
^.i—H***.

31, V, United States Steel
(N.D. Ohio 1980).
1s
•3

/

•

.

See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against Shutdown^

industry.

generous.

Sometimes the contribution
Por example,

is

quite

in return for picking

Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
for the site of its VW
Rabbit
auto plant, the Volkswagen
Corporation was given $ 100
million in state and local
government aid.
The state
would finance a $ 10 million
rail spur and give
Volkswagen a $ 40 million 1.75%
long-term loan, while
local government would
settle for tax abatements
which
meant that Volkswagen would
pay less taxes annually
than it charged for a single
Rabbit."
The people in greater
Youngstown and Pittsburgh
did not expect any corporation
to stay in a business
that was no longer profitable,
what they did expect,
however, was that if the current
owners of the steel

plants wanted to leave the steel
business, they would
do so without unnecessarily wreaking
havoc on the

surrounding local economy.

The workers and local

community leaders wanted steel to sell out
rather than
just shut down and leave.

The steel corporations,

for

their part, did not want to sell because
they could see
larger profits in selling off machinery and
equipment
and turning industrial plants into industrial
parks.
In addition,

as David Roderick, Chairman of the Board

of United States Steel,

16

explained that

See Robert Lineberry, Governmen t in America 3rd
Edition (Boston Toronto: Little Brown and Co., 1986).

ly

^^

Uld not be interested
in
r°
°
£
lln only tt s'uccessf
6Y We
mass ively
subsidized by the fedL^
government.
We are
not, in other wordf
lit SSted ln
subsidized competit'i^ £f °
r ° ur "lves at
"
other
locations"

seUinu°th

llWT

"

""""g

Roderick

comment reflects

managers

traditionally

one-sided definition of
subsidies,

where direct loans
to communities to Keep
industries from shutting
down
would be considered subsidies,
tax abatements used to
lure business to a community
and the usual

externalities that communities
often provide are not
considered subsidies.
When Lynd makes the case for
industrial reinvestment where the workers are,
called "brownfield
modernization, « rather than building
anew elsewhere on
the assumption that the workers
will follow
the jobs,

or

"greenfield modernization," he argues
that more than
economic costs must be weighed. He says
that

A comparison of the costs to the company
of
greenfield modernization and brownfield
modernization is only the first step in an
adequate analysis. One must also consider
social costs.
Even if greenfield
modernization were cheaper for the company,
it might be more expensive for society
as a
whole. 18

"
P

•

See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against shntrtn^.,

137.

/" See st aunton Lynd, The Fight Aa.in.f
Shutdowns, p. 37.

community property activists
argue that busines.53
is
obligated to consider the
costs to society as
part o £
the cost or disinvestment.
This would be following
the
logic of the original
decision to invest in a
particular community.

At that time,

subtr,^

fcom
the costs of starting up
a business was
the community's
contribution in the form of
various

economic

externalities.

This was

a

kind of loan that could
be

paid off only with the continued
operation of the
Plant.
Should the owners want to leave,
that debt must
be added to the cost of
leaving.
Again, the debt can
be paid off only by the
continued operation of the
Plant
if not by the original
owners, then by the
new, local owners.
According to this theory, the
original owners should not be allowed
to leave without
first settling all their debts
including what they
owe the community.

-

-

After coming to the understanding of
the problem
as Lynd describes it, the steelworkers
raised new

questions.

The Constitution speaks to private
property

but also to public welfare.

Do private businesses have

unfettered property rights or do communities that
foster businesses thereby have constitutional
community

property rights that can supersede business decisions
to abandon them?

Could the Constitution that is

popularly interpreted as the protector of individual

.

liberties, be interpreted as
the protector of
conununity
rights? would such arguments
win in court? The
last
is an especially
difficult question since
historically
the courts often found
that workers' rights
threatened
individual liberties and
therefore the courts could
not
support workers' claims.- The
problem, as Lynd
explained it, is that "tslome
things simply cannot be
quantified.
The challenge ... is to
find a precise way
to talk about values that
cannot be measured.
The Tri-state Conference on
steel responded to
this challenge by promoting a
new conception of a

constitutional community property right.
of years,

For a number

the Tri-state Conference on steel
had worked

to show communities that their
right of eminent domain

already accorded them the power and the
right to
participate in the business decisions that
affect them.
They argue that communities have the right
to take

over

businesses that can be run efficiently when

conglomerates are milking them of their profits.

in

19

See Leon Fink, "Labor, Liberty, and the Law:
Trade Unionism and the Problem of American
Constitutional Order," The Journal of American History
74 (1987) :904-925.
20 See Staunton Lynd,
p.
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,

turn,

the community can
set up a business
managed by
workers in the business
and other members of
the

community. 21
While the public interest
is not popularly
considered a community r
p op ert y clght , the power
o£
government at all levels
to p rot ect and to
promote it
is recognized in the
police power and the power
of
eminent domain." In the
last claU3e q£
Amendment a limit delineates
the nature of that power:
"nor shall private propeity
be taken

^

^

^

without just compensation."

^

^

Controversy about the

nature of the police power has
often been associated
with the compensation issue.
Pre-revolutionary
American republicanism is said
not to have seen the
need for a just compensation
clause in the
constitution.

The republic of the Jeffersonlan
ideal

with its spirit of civic-mindedness
endorsed public
takings without compensation to further
the common
good.
This in turn furthered the purpose of
government

according to the Jef f ersonians; leading
people to an
understanding of what the good was. The just

compensation clause was put in the Constitution by
James Madison to discourage public takings.
2 1

See Mike Stout, "Eminent Domain and Bank
1 Labor Research Review 3
1983 ): 48-56

Boycotts,"
22

(1877).

Even he

(

.

See Munn v. Illinois 94 U.S. 133; 14 L. Ed. 77

acknowledged the American
tradition that believed in
furthering the common good
through public takings,
however.
Madison envisxoned the
compensation clause as
having a narrow legal
meaning that referred only
to
Physical takings and was
intended to apply only to
activities of the federal
government. Early state
constitutions included just
compensation clauses as
limits on gubernatorial power
to take property.
These
clauses were, in time, revised
to limit the state

legislatures in this area.

m

all of these cases,

however, the fundamental principle
was the question of
compensation not the legitimacy of

takings."

By 1877, the United States Supreme
Court was

considering a new definition of property,
much broader
than Madison's narrow focus on physical
property.
in

Munn

V,

Illinois ,

24

the Supreme Court laid the

foundation for substantive due process which would
come
to recognize deprivations of other than
physical

property.

While substantive due process refers to

inverse condemnation rather than eminent domain, its

doctrinal development has contributed to the

23

See Notes, "The Origins and Original
Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment," 94 The Ya le Law Journal 3-fi94-7lfi.
24

94 U.S.

133;

24 L.

Ed.

77

(1877).

.

constitutional definition of
property generally which
in turn affects the
doctrine of eminent domain.In both inverse condemnation
and eminent domain,

the taking must be for
public use.

what constitutes'

Public use has come to be the
heart of the debate about
eminent domain.
Until 1954, the Court
interpreted
public use to mean private
property taken by the
government that would then stay
in the public's hands.
This was most commonly the
taking of
land for roads,

schools, parks and other clear
public uses.
definition was considerably expanded

The

in 1954 when the

Court in asman, y

t

P^rK^r 26 upheld Congress'

condemnation of private property in the
District of
Columbia for urban renewal. Once the
land was
condemned, it was sold to private parties
for

development.

Critics argued that the condemned

property must be used directly by the public
but the
Court ruled that slum clearance and urban
renewal
constituted public use since

it

served the public

welfare

2S

Inverse condemnation is distinct from eminent
domain.
Eminent domain involves the compulsory
transfer of property to the government.
In contrast,
in an inverse condemnation, the government places
restrictions on the use and enjoyment of the property
through the police power.
2e

348 U.S.

26

(1954).

.

.

~ Kg

v

Pr " r * Chnrrh

mr^ ." the court
answered arguments that
eminent domain used to
promote
economic welfare could
interfere with interstate
commerce by positing

-

a

,

three pronged test.

First, the

compensation must enable the
owner to taKe the proceeds
and use them to continue
operations elsewhere.
Second,
the condemnation must be
for a legitimate end.
The
Court held that sustaining
the local economy and

avoiding municipal bankruptcy
are valid government
objects.
Third, the condemnation action
must result in
local benefits which outweigh
any incidental burdens on
commerce
Like all constitutional tests,
issues as it resolves,

£U^

raises as many

who's to say when a "local

benefit" outweighs "incidental burdens" on
commerce?
What constitutes legitimate use?

Critics of current

eminent domain law contend the law fails to
establish

boundaries and therefore "anything goes." 28

Certainly

cases are considered in court using eminent domain
in

new ways and unexpected places.

Consequently, when the

owners of the Oakland Raiders decided to relocate their

National Football League franchise, the City of Oakland

attempted to stop the move through eminent domain.
27

397 U.S.

137

(1970)

.

28

See Notes, "Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are
There Limits after Oakland Raiders and Poletown?,"
California Wester n Law Review 20 1983 ): 82-108
(

.

As any football fan
knows, however,

the former

Oakland Raiders are now the
Los Angeles Raiders.
Oakland was barred from the
use of eminent domain in
this case.
courts ruled that it failed
to show that
the football franchise was
essential to the economic
health and well-being of
Oakland.
The California
Supreme Court held, however,
that owning and operating
a sports franchise may
be a valid public use.
There is
a consensus in the law
literature that Oakland as well
as the communities opposing
plant shutdowns have been

campaigning about legitimate public
uses."
What the limits of public use
are and what

constitutes a public use remain important
political and
legal questions.
Can a municipality or state condemn
property to promote economic welfare and
then turn the

property over to private hands?

When General Motors

announced plans to close its Detroit Cadillac
assembly
plant, Detroit was faced with the loss of
thousands of
jobs.

General Motors agreed to stay in Detroit if a

suitable site could be found for a new modern plant
that required large acreage and easy access to major

29

See Notes, "The Origins and Original
Significance of The Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment," The Yale Law Journal 34 (1985):694716; Comments, Ohio Northern University La w Review XII
1985) :231-249; Comments, Albany Law Review 49
(1984) :95-130; Notes, "Public Use in Eminent Domain:
Are There Limits after Oakland Raiders and Poletown?,"
California Wester n Law Review 20 1983 ): 82-108
(

(
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highways.

Eventually, a site was found
in an old, well
established and tightly knit
Polish neighborhood
in

Detroit, hardly a slum or a
scene of blight.
Nevertheless, the Michigan Supreme
Court upheld
condemning the site on the grounds
that protecting a
large number of dobs constituted
a legitimate public
use

According to community property
theorists, Detroit
had a property interest in
General Motors and was
right

in helping to relocate the
plant within Detroit.

While
Detroit did use its power of eminent
domain to take
property in the hope of retaining jobs,
this seizure
was carried out under the traditional
conception
of

property ownership.

Detroit did not consider itself an

investor in General Motors when it made the
site

available nor when it had provided other benefits
to
General Motors over the years.

The claim of the

community rights activists is that communities have

a

tangible property interest in both the economic and the
social environment of their communities.

Therefore,

corporate decisions that damage the social fabric of a

community exceed their own property rights.
Lynd's effort to talk about values that cannot be

measured leads him to analyze the social impact of

disinvestment on local communities and the people
living there.

He frequently quotes ordinary

.

individuals who° exDresi
express fh«i,
their j,
dismay over the change
in
their communities.
"v ou
felt as if the mill „
ould

always be there."

"Most people couldn't
believe it.
It was so huge and had
operated so long and so
many
people depended on it for
their livelihood.""
when
activists like Lynd talk to
workers about a community
property right, they know what
he means.
These words
reverberate with their own sense
of what the American
system promises. Community, like
individualism, is an
American value.

Lynd makes it clear that the
idea of a community
property right was not the construction
of

intellectuals.

ivory tower

He writes that

I have deliberately
placed rank-and-file
steelworkers in the center of the narrative.
I
think that they belong there.
it was a
steelworker ... who first talked ... about
the importance of modernizing mills
in
existing steelmaking communities
it was a
steel worker ... [who] first proposed
employee-community ownership of the mills
It was a Pittsburgh steelworker ...
who while
serving as a Pennsylvania state legislator
developed the idea of a "Monongahela Valley
Authority" which could buy and operate steel
mills that private companies no longer wish

to run. 31

30

See Staunton Lynd, "Towards a Not-For-Prof it
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition
and Use of Industrial Property," p. 16.
31 See Staunton
Lynd,
p.
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.

In discussinq tne
strategy ot using eminent
y the st-r^t-*™
domain to

pursue community rights, Lynd
argues that the
steelworkers. experience is
quite similar to that of
those who established the
Tennessee Valley Authority.
When private enterprise does
not want to run a needed
business, the community can do
it itself.
"This was

believed to be the rhetoric with
which the Tennessee
valley Authority had been created....
Mid dle Americans,
who would indignantly have
rejected the word
'socialism' on the belief that private
enterprise was
intrinsically superior to public enterprise,
readily
accepted eminent domain as a pragmatic
response to

disinvestment

1,32

Lynd, a left radical, believes in local
democratic

control in which people understand what

is

happening to

them and have the information and power to
influence
the decisions that affect them.

His efforts have been

directed at both those in power and those without
who
are living in the community.
He wants to convince
those in power to make an effort to stem the tide of

economic crises.

And he wants to educate the local

community about its economic history and its politics
in the hope of fostering more active and assertive

democratic citizenship.
32

The usefulness of eminent

See Staunton Lynd, "Towards a Not-For-Prof it
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition
and Use of Industrial Property," p. 25.

.

domain in the struggle
against corporate disinvestment
depends on political and
economic factors rather than
legal ones.
There is little doubt that
it
is a tool

available to the communities as
far as the law is
concerned.
it remains to be seen
whether communities
have the will to use it. 33

Writing on this topic several
years ago, Yale r.™
Journal editors commented on several social
and

economic considerations

.

=»«

should communities begin to

take over corporations, it might
encourage managers to
operate their plants less efficiently on
the theory

that they always had a ready buyer if times
got rough.
On the other hand, of course, workers may
be more

efficient and productive when they have
stake in a plant.

a

financial

Or might firms be unwilling to

locate in the first place in communities where other

plants have been condemned?

Or might they be induced

to relocate there thinking the community would buy
them

out if they wanted to leave.

Of course, no firm could

be sure the community would do so and could risk a

great loss of trust and goodwill
threats.
33

BfiyJjBJi

if

it made idle

In any event, the use of eminent domain is a

See Comments, Ohio Nort hern University Law
XII (1985) 231-249.
:

3*

See Notes, "The Origins and Original
Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment," The Yale Law Journal 94 1985 ): 694-716
(

last resort.

Community property rights
activists
would, no doubt, prefer to
see firms maintain
a

commitment to an area on their
own.
The movement in Youngstown
and Pittsburgh has had
little success in saving
jobs.
The Tri-state

Conference on Steel has yet to
realize the saving of
any steel jobs but it has
received a $600,000 grant
to

study the feasibility of
reopening one of Pittsburgh's
electrically powered steel furnaces."
L ynd has a

broader view, however.

He stresses the intellectual

transformation that has occurred, noting
that
generations of American radicals have

tried to present

the idea of community ownership
in a manner acceptable
to their fellow citizens.
Lynd believes that while the

struggle has not brought to fruition a
constitutional

community property right itself, it has
made the
conception of the right meaningful.

He writes that

What the steel town communities of the
Mahoning and Monongahela Valleys have
witnessed in the struggle to save the mills
has been a community of worker intellectuals
doggedly pursuing the idea of a community
right in industrial property, step by
pragmatic step, arriving at proposals fully
as radical as any previously suggested, yet
framing them democratically, and in the
American grain, in such a way as to bring
others along with them
I consider that
the set of ideas that I have described
constitute the splitting of an atom that has
long frustrated those seeking needed

3B Conversation with
Staunton Lynd August 26,

1987.

fundamental change in the Untied
ateS
This is no small achievement." states

"

'

The steelworkers' activities
have affected

communities outside the Rust Belt.

Workers elsewhere

are learning and using the
language of the community
property rights movement. The
Midwest Center for Labor
Research has taken on the task of
documenting
the

social cost of unemployment due to
corporate

disinvestment.

reliable figures

Their purpose is to provide "[hlard
and
...

help a broader range of

[to]

people understand the actual social costs
of corporate
strategy.
it helps large groups of people to
coalesce
and to demand a role in the decisions
involving

industrial development." 3

''

More and more organized

workers are unwilling to discuss business decisions
in

purely economic terms.

The director of the Midwest

Center for Labor Research writes about "moral and legal

questions" and sharpening "our sense of moral outrage."
Ultimately, he concludes it is "not 'moral' to not

intervene in what has been historically accepted as
'management rights.

•" 3B

3S See Staunton
Lynd,

"Towards a Not-For-Prof it
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition
and Use of Industrial Property," p. 35.
37

See Dan Swinney, "Documenting the Social Cost
of Unemployment," Labor Res earch Review 1 (1986): 49.
See Dan Swinney,
of Unemployment," p. 56.

"Documenting the Social Cost

The labor newsletters
and community development
analyses of the current
economic situation use the
same
words.
The proble, is corporate
disinvestment.
The
C ° St 15
ZZZlMX disintegration.
The solution is
dem ° C t1r contro1 on the
level.
The
idea is that communities
have rights that are equal
to
those of corporations. **
while organized labor is

^

loc^J^mm^
,

central in the coalition supporting

a

community

property right, local business
leaders

affected
areas are also feeling the
compulsion to redefine their
role in the community. +°
in

Eminent Domain in New Bedford
A struggle against disinvestment in
the last

decade that parallels the steelworkers

•

plight but has

had greater success is that of the United
Electrical

Workers' Local 277

(

UE Local 277) and the community of

New Bedford, Massachusetts at Morse Cutting Tools.
Both the size and kind of the business

is

different but

39

See especially Labor Research Review articles
on plant closings in Vol. 1, Fall 1982; Vol, No 3,
Summer 1983; Vol. 2, No. 1 Fall 1986 and Gilda Haas,
Plant Closures:
Myths. Realities and Responses
.

AO See generally Dan Swinney,
Social Cost of Unemployment."

"Documenting the

.

.

the nature of the proofen,
and the response o£
the
workers and the conununity
is si m il ar to that
of the

steelworkers
The Morse Cutting Tool
Company was a family owned

and operated business from
its founding in 1864
until
it was taken over in
1968 by Gulf and Western.
The
Plant was unionized in 1941
and enjoyed good labor

management relations; there were
only six disputes
brought to arbitration and only
one strike.
Relations
between labor and management
remained friendly until
1981 when Gulf and Western decided
to take on the

unions in all its operations in
an attempt to reduce
overall labor costs and increase
its return on

investment

-*

.

1

First, the union local contracted
with the
Industrial Cooperative Association (ICA),
a

Massachusetts labor research group, to do an
assessment
of the long term viability of Morse
Cutting Tools.* 2

The union then asked Massachusetts Institute
of

Technology economist Bennett Harrison to review the
study and decide whether he thought Gulf and Western

«* See generally Dan Swinney, "Documenting
the
Social Cost of Unemployment."
*a

Industrial Cooperative Association (1982).
"Investment Strategy and Morse Cutting Tool," Labor
Research Review 1 1982 ): 18-23
(

was disinvesting from
Morse.-

The analysis Qf both

Harrison and ICA was that
Gulf and Western was
disinvesting from Morse and
that the unions' concerns
were warranted. At this
point the union began to
educate the New Bedford
community about the problem of
disinvestment and approached
community leaders.
it was
a union and a community
struggle from then on.
"There
were state and local political
figures, members of the
Chamber of Commerce, community
personalities
all
with different interests and
certainly not uniform in
their support of militant trade
unionism.
But they
could become part of a common front
against

-

G&W's

policy of disinvestment."**
The cutting tool industry was in a
severe

recession when in August of 1983, Gulf and
Western
announced plans to either sell Morse or shut it
down.
The union, UE Local 277, and the community
then geared
up to find a buyer committed to maintaining the

business in New Bedford.

On June

4,

1984, New Bedford

Mayor Brian Lawler announced the city would seize the
plant through the power of eminent domain and sell it

43

See Bennett Harrison, "Gulf and Western
Model of Disinvestment," Labor Res earch Review 1

—

A

(1982) :18-23.
** see Dan Swinney,
of Unemployment," p. 10.
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to a

auaim ed

buyer.

This announcement was
given

national attention and a
buyer was found without
use of eminent domain.

Mki „,

The buyer, however, was
under-capitalized and

over-extended and,

i

n

January 1987,

f

Ue d

for

bankruptcy.

Again the workers and
community were
looking for a buyer who would
keep the plant in New
Bedford.
the end, two buyers made
bids on the
Plant.
one was a St. Louis firm
that wanted only the
machinery and planned to strip
the plant and then
exploit its real estate value.
The other was a firm
from Scotland that would invest
in the plant and keep
it running in New Bedford.

m

With the decision solely in the
hands of the
bankruptcy judge, the community
nevertheless redoubled
its efforts to keep the plant
open in New Bedford.

The

union contacted everyone it could in
St. Louis to
pressure that buyer to withdraw its bid,
even taking
out a full page ad in the S
t, Louis Post

The

BjaBafcfih,

ad was signed by 30 community leaders
ranging from the

mayor of New Bedford to its U.S. representative
to the
president of the Whaling City Youth Baseball League.* 0
Neither buyer backed out, and the St. Louis firm

estimated its bid at a million dollars more than that
of the Scotish firm.
4a

The bankruptcy judge, however,

WE MeWS. July 20, 1987, p. 6-7.

estimated the difference as
only about $100,000. Even
though the St. Louis bid was
still larger, the judge
decided that the fate of 300
jobs tipped the scales in
favor of the buyer who would
maintain the company in
the community.
The case of Morse Cutting Tools
is significant
because it shows the viability of the
concept of a

constitutional community property right.

At one point

the city was willing to incur the
expense of

condemnation proceedings and ultimately

a federal

bankruptcy judge counted jobs and what they
meant to
the community as more valuable than money
in weighing
the two offers.

The judge did not ignore the claims of

the Morse creditors but neither did he ignore the

claims of the community.

Unlike this bankruptcy judge, the federal judge in
the Youngstown breach of promise case had not been able
to find a basis in law for the community property right

claim.

Even in that case, however, the judge saw some

justice in the claim.

He said that

United States Steel should not be permitted
to leave the Youngstown area devastated after
drawing from the lifeblood of the community
for so many years.
Unfortunately, the
mechanism to reach the ideal settlement, to

86

recognize this new property

rich*-

Notice that the ju dge
says , mechanlsm

c.-u»ity property right

,

s

„

^

nQt

•

^
^

^

^

laws.

This ls significantly
dlfferent £rom sayin?
>dea and the Constitution
are mutually exclusive.
Clearly, like the communlties

^

^

this jud ge could make
"sense- out or the claim,
even
he could not yet make
"law" out of it."'

Concl

lis

if

r.^
)

Enough towns have considered
using eminent domain
to maintain local economies
that its significance
should not be dismissed lightly.In addition,

the

United states Congress and
eighteen states have enacted
legislation to restrict in some
measure the free flow
of capital out of their
borders.

These bills have

ranged from requiring only 30 to 60
days notice of

46
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For a legal argument in support of Local
suit, see Daniel A. Farber and John H.
Matheson,
Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and
the
Invisible Handshake,'" The University of Chicago Law
Review 52 (1985): 4.

../
n
1330 s
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See Mike Stout, "Eminent Domain and Bank
Boycotts," Labor Re search Review
1983 ): 48-56
1

(

.

shutdown, to severance pay
and

f ring e

benefits for one

year.

Most states require one
year's notification of
intent to close.
About three-quarters
require some
sort of severance payment.This activity suggests
that the view of what the
Constitution promises is
changing and as such merits our
attention.

Scheingold argues that
is

a

transformation of culture

required for fundamental change.

He has

reservations about the political
relevance of legal or
constitutional rights strategies
because he asserts a
rights strategy is unlikely to
be socially
transformative.

Rights strategies fail as agents of

change because they give a false sense
of what the
problem and the solution are
the myth of rights
problem.
in addition, and more fatal to the
chance for
change, legal ideology undermines a vision
of a more

—

communal social order.

in the end,

Scheingold stops

short of repudiating the politics of rights, however.
He looks "with ambivalent favor on approaches to
change

that keep us in touch with liberal democratic

values

in this context,

the politics of rights can

be recommended because it is linked to the ethic of

See Richard B. McKenzie, Fugitive I ndustries
(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984).

rights but it is not caught
up in the steriie aog
ma tis m
of the myth of rights." 30
When communities use the
power of eminent domain
to protect the communities'
interests, they have
adopted a new approach to the
politics
of rights.

it

is

Structurally different from conventional
rights
litigation and, therefore, may be

useful as an agent of

change.

Eminent domain is based on the
idea of

community rather than individual
interests.
exercised by groups of people responding

it

is

to

socioeconomic or political, rather than
legal,
considerations.

Eminent domain, then, is compatible

with the communal vision that Scheingold
finds

necessary for
culture.

a fundamental change

in our political

Communities like Youngstown and Pittsburgh,

New Bedford, Detroit, and Oakland appear to have a
sense of this communal vision.
Just as using the power of eminent domain makes a

politics of rights strategy different from other
campaigns, Staunton Lynd's point of view encourages

people to take a somewhat different view of the law.
He uses the law as leverage

itself.

—

it is not the end

He is attuned to the wider non-legal politics

BO
See Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Rights
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

in the whole struggle
and shares Scheingold's
view of

the law.

Lynd says that

6
1
6 ° f a law suit is
that it
takes ?^
the action out
of the hands of workers
and tends to make them
'
passive spectators
ITlhe very existence of
lawyers and court;*"
encourages people to believe
get into court" things will, that "if only we
somehow tCrn
out differently.
This faith Is

^^^

misplaced?"

in evaluating the efficacy
of legal tactics to save
jobs, Lynd concludes that

n^V^
arger
h2 %S?f V

be V8ry USeful when ifc
stru ggle, but should not
^
e
n alone
Tne heart of resistance
!
?n a shutdown
to
must be the struggle of
workers, not of lawyers. 52

!

onToarf

?°

*

Lynd does not focus on judicial
legitimation of
worker and community claims. As blacks
and their

allies have sadly learned, custom and culture
controls
our social practices in ways that courts
cannot even

begin to touch on their own.

people to conceive of

a

Consequently, Lynd wants

community property right and to

take politics into their own hands democratically so

that they themselves come to their own understanding of
what the Constitution protects and promotes.

He is

tapping the American legal culture to transform it, not

simply to add one more right to individuals' legal or
constitutional arsenals.
91 See Staunton Lynd,
p.

B2 See Staunton Lynd,
p.

The Fight Against

S hutdowns

,

The Fight Against Shutdowns

,

188.

189.

The political practices
explored in this chapter

generated a new conception
of

a

constitutional rig ht

and posited a new arena
for an old legal
struggle
the community instead of
the courtroom,
unlike

-

traditional political rights
struggles, the community
property right movement does
not look to the Supreme
Court for affirmation of its
claim or characterize
policy problems in simple
"rights and remediesfashion.
Consequently, while the movement
is a
politics of rights, it is not
rooted in the legal

ideology that fosters the myth
of rights.

The movement

is

predicated on replacing the present
culture of
individual competition and reward with
a

more communal

social order using the tactics of
grassroots democratic
action educating the public on the
issues and building
consensus around shared values. The
community property
movement has conceived of a redistr ibut i
ve role for

litigation through the community's power of
eminent
domain and has thereby expanded the possibility

that a

politics of rights can be an agent of change.

CHAPTER

4.

CONGRESS ON THE CONSTITUTIONTHE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FIRMS
FOR THE
HOUSE AND SENATE
'

A significant part of Congress*
constitutional

interpretive practice comes from the
important but
little known offices of legal
counsel that Congress
established in the last decade to
defend and protect
its institutional interests
before the Supreme

Court.

These offices operate as Congress'
firms."

"constitutional law

They are the Office of the Senate Legal

Counsel and the Office of the Counsel
to the Clerk.
These offices are small with only one client,
but that

client is the Congress of the United States.

Intr oduct i on

The work of these law offices and its relationship
to how Congress handles constitutional questions
came
to my attention as part of the answer to a question

U.S. Circuit Judge Abner J. Mikva raised in a 1983

North Carolina Law Review ^rtirlp in which he asked:
"How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the

Constitution?" 1

This question must be posed against

a

prior question, however.

How does Congress support and

defend the Constitution?

Certainly, as

1

a

legislature,

See Abner J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?" The North
Carolina Law Review 61 (1983):587.

.

does this differently
from a court and the activity
may not present itself
directly as constitutional
interpretive practice. Therefore
„e should understand
Congress' view of the
Constitution not just by what it
says about the document
but also by what actions
it

Congress takes

-

actions it believes to be

constitutional
Congress can pursue constitutional
meaning down
four main avenues.
its influence is felt when
it
approves court appointments.
it can respond to Court
interpretations by rewriting statutes
weaving around
specific Court objections and it
frequently

does this.

For example, Congress passed the
Keating-Owen Act in

1916 which was to protect child labor but
the Court

declared it unconstitutional in Hammer

v.

n at7 . n hfl rt

2

Between 1918 and 1938, Congress made various
attempts
at protective labor legislation. Finally in
1938,

Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act which was
a

comprehensive protective labor law including

protection for child labor.

Subsequently, the Court

upheld this legislation in United States

v.

Darbv

.

3

More recently, Congress has thwarted, in part, Roe v.

2
3

247 U.S. 251

(1918)

.

312 U.S.

(1941)

.
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l.g.Hzl„ g abortion by
pa3slng the

"lied

"„ yde

Anient"

comy

which prohibits m edl
cald

funding for abortions.

Congress can also initiate
constitutional
amendments to overturn Court
decisions.
This is, of
course, the roughest and
least traveled path.or
Congress can show its
differences with Court
judgments
by attempting to remove
certain subject areas
from the
Court's jurisdiction with
what are commonly called
"court-curbing" bills. The one
court-curbing bill ever
passed by Congress was in
the Reconstruction
period.
As part of the Reconstruction
Acts, Congress enacted
the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867.
The intent of the law

was to prevent the harassment
of freed slaves but its
first use was by William H.
McCardle, a racist editor
of the Vicksburg (Mississippi)
Times who had been

arrested by the military for
publishing an article
critical of Reconstruction. McCardle

lost the case and

appealed to the Supreme Court.

in order to forestall

the Court's ruling in this case,
Congress enacted

legislation in 1868 which repealed the
Court's

appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising
under the
4

410 U.S.

113

(1973).

D

The Eleventh Amendment was passed to overturn
Chlsholm v. GPnrgjfl i Dallas 419 (1793). The
Sixteenth Amendment was passed to overturn Pollock v
Farmers' Loan and Trust Cn.
158 U.S. 601 (1895).
f

r

r

.

Habeas Corpus Act of 1867
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.

«

while this is the only

time Congress has actually
changed the Court's
jurisdiction, even its possibility
rouses immediate
dire warnings from the
scholarly community where
there
is no consensus as to
whether or not these bills
are
constitutional 7
A fifth avenue has opened
up in the last decade
that does not have some of the
political and

institutional problems of the other
three
Congress' constitutional law
offices

-

the use of

to cull and

articulate Congress' constitutional
thought.
offices were established in response

These

to a change over

time in the Executive's interpretation
of the

Faithfully Execute Clause.

Beginning in 1926,

presidents have declined to defend acts of
Congress
before the Supreme Court in some cases.'
More

recently, President Jimmy Carter's attorney
general

declined in 1980 to defend the constitutionality
of the
Public Broadcasting Corporation Act but upon
change of

administrations, Ronald Reagan's attorney general
See Sheldon Goldman, Constituti onal Law: r.**^
and Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1987).
"

7

See Gerald Gunther, "Congressional Power to
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate," Stanford L aw Review 36
(1984) :895.
' See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926)
and Humphrey's Execut or v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935)
.

decided to defend the act.

While every act of
Congress

must be defended before
the Court, it is no
longer
always the case that it is
the Solicitor General
who
does so.
Now Congress has its own
lawyers who are
accountable directly to, and only
to, Congress.
And,
unlike the Solicitor General,
their loyalty is not
divided between two branches.
Both court-curbing bills and
the work of these law
offices enable Congress to directly
influence

constitutional interpretation.

Court-curbing

legislation, however, does so negatively.

By simply

silencing the Court, it would leave
us with neither
Court nor Congressional constitutional
reasoning.

Through its constitutional law offices
Congress can,
instead, focus its own constitutional
thought and then
join the debate.

The threat of court-curbing legislation
prompted
U.S. Circuit Judge and former Congressman
Abner J.

Mikva to assert some years ago that Congress was
incapable of adequately interpreting the Constitution
for itself.

Mikva argued that far from being curbed,

the Supreme Court should have the final say.

quickly joined in

9

He was

this debate by Congressional

Research Service Specialist Louis Fisher who made the

* See Abner M
Mikva, "How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?," p. 611.
.

case for both a capacity
and an interest in

constitute

interpretation by Congress.

believes that constitutional
interpretation
misunderstood when framed in

P i 3her
is

terms o £ »f lnal say „
and

should,

instead, be understood as
a matter o£

"participating in a dialogue"
on the Constitution."
This dialogue should not
be understood as only
between
the court and Congress,
however.
There is dialogue
within congress on the
Constitution
which the law

offices cull.

It is this discussion
that is captured

in the briefs.

In this chapter

I

explore these two most direct

and deliberate mechanisms for
congressional influence
on constitutional meaning,
court-curbing legislation

and the work of Congress'
constitutional law offices.
I
argue that Congress would fail to
fulfill its

constitutional role were it simply to
defer to the
Court without considering for itself
the

constitutionality of its acts.

While

I

believe that

court-curbing legislation is constitutional,
with its critics that its use

is

I

agree

dysfunctional for the

constitutional system since it squelches rather than
fosters discourse.

Consequently, Congress'

constitutional law offices offer the more viable
10 Fisher,

U985W07

"Constitutional Interpretation by

C ° ngreSS '" North Carolina Law RpvIpw

^

mechanism through which
Congress can fulfil!
its
mission as a co-egual
voice of the Constitution.

Court Cnrhinn

There has yet to be

a

LPg ^
i

i

^^

n

consensus on the extent
of

Congress- power to change
or remove federal
judicial
review authority and while
only once in the nation-*
history has Congress succeeded
in passing a courtcurbing bill, court-curbing
bills should be understood
as part of Congress'
constitutional interpretative
practice.
Arguably, they have an influence
on the
Court even without their
passage.- These bills
surface in Congress at moments
of greatest

dissatisfaction with specific court
decisions.
Butler-Jenner Bill" of 1958, for

The

example, was an

attempt to remove from federal
appellate authority
cases concerning five subject
areas in which the Court
had recently handed down
controversial decisions.

this bill passed,

it

Were

would have deprived the Court of

appellate jurisdiction in all cases of:
contempt

X X

See generally Gerald Gunther, "Congressional
Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:
An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate." See
also
Leslie Friedman Goldstein, "The ERA and the U.S.
Supreme Court," Research n Law and Policy Stndi^
l
i

r

12 S.

2646,

85th Cong.,

1st Sess.

(1957).

proceedings against witnesses
before congressional
committees, dismissal of
government employees on
security grounds, state laws
for the control of
subversive activities,
regulations relating to
subversive activities of
public school teachers,
and
state requirements for
admission to the practice of
law.
The bill did not pass and
was attacked
as an

unconstitutional exercise of
Congressional power.
its
critics argued that since it
precluded Supreme Court
review in every case involving
a particular subject,
it
was an unconstitutional
encroachment on the Court's

essential functions.

Court-curbing bills entered a period
of quiescence
until the first Reagan Administration.
Again, in
response to specific Court judgments,
members of
Congress submitted over thirty
jurisdiction-stripping
bills.

Dissatisfaction stemmed mainly from Court

decisions dealing with the controversial issues
of
school prayer, abortion and busing. 13
Congress' power to determine the appellate

authority of the federal courts
Article III Section

2

is

established in

of the Constitution.

The

Constitution gives the Court appellate jurisdiction
"with such exceptions, and under such Regulations as
13 See Gerald
Gunther,

"Congressional Power to
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate," p. 895.

Congress shall make- over all
cases within the judicial
power of the United states
originating in state or
lower federal courts.

what this means in regard to

Congress- power and, further,
what it would mean for
the constitutional system were
the power exercised,
have been the subjects of much
scholarly debate in the
last thirty years.
In 1960,

Leonard

G.

Ratner argued Congress does

not have the power to withdraw
jurisdiction in

specified subject areas.

This, according to him, would

encroach on "essential functions" of the
Supreme Court.
Ratner defined the "essential functions" of the
Court

as providing a uniform and consistent
national law.

in

Ratner's estimate, an interpretation of Article III,
Section

2

that gave Congress plenary control over the

appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would mean
that "[it] can all but destroy the coordinate judicial

branch and thus upset the delicately poised

constitutional system of checks and balances." 14
Ratner is not alone in his fears for the

constitutional system were Congress to have authority
over the Court such that it or others by default became
the ultimate authority on the Constitution.

what Mikva fears.

This is

But Ratner's "essential functions"

14 See Leonard G. Ratner,

"Congressional Power
Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,"
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 109 (1960):158.

argument has failed to persuade
recent scholars.
Martin H. Redish rejects the
"essential functions"
argument and looks instead to the
Fourteenth Amendment
for a constitutional limit
on Congress' power.
Redish
argues, "...Congress cannot employ
its article III
powers to regulate federal
jurisdiction in a manner
that violates another constitutional
provision, and

...

[since] the due process clause
requires the

availability of

a

forum that is formally independent
of

the body alleged to have violated
constitutional

rights...," state supreme courts would
be unavailable
in some cases and thus the Supreme
Court
is

appellate review.

«

needed for

This argument is a variation on

that of Lawrence Sager who argues that there
are limits
on Congress'
f

Article III powers because there must be a

ederal forum for constitutional claims.

Like Ratner,

these scholars are struggling to locate the

constitutional bar to Congress' removing Supreme Court
jurisdiction in specified cases.
The reason no one has found a satisfactory

argument against Congress' plenary control in this area

may be because the Constitution does in fact give this
wide discretionary power to Congress.

This is Gerald

XB See Martin H. Redish, "Constitutional
Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal
Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager,"

Northwestern Univ ersity Law Review 77 (1982):163.

Gunther's reading of Article
in.
bit more sanguine than
Ratner

100

Gunther

u

quifce a

and Mikva about what
this

means for the system as
a whole.

believes Congress

.J^^

He,

exercise

^^

li ke they,

tMs

^

takes comfort in the fact
that only once has it
done
so.
Gunther, however, recalls
the debates in the

Constitutional Convention that
culminated
compromise that Article in

in the

expresses- and notes that

the early thought was to
depend upon state courts for
the adjudication of constitutional
claims.
Further,
the Framers, according to
Gunther, believed Congress
should make the determinations as
to when a state

rather than a federal court should
answer

constitutional questions.
In a real sense then,

Congress's judgment, perhaps

coming through the back door of

a

state court, was

meant to supercede that of the Supreme Court
in some

constitutional areas,

in fact,

in all areas not

falling within the Court's original jurisdiction.

This

view has its supporters and they include the Supreme
Court. 17

what is, of course, most notable about this

view is that it

is Congress which has been most

unwilling to exercise the power.

When presented with

X6

See Gerald Gunther, "Congressional Power to
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate," p. 912.
17 See Ex Parte McCardle

r

7

Wallace 506 (1869).

court-curbing bllls Congress
,
has

^

^

^

as the ulUn.ate
constitutional authority.
Ftom Ratner
to Gunther to Mikva,
the consensus is that
this is as
it should be.
Mikva. s arguments<

howevec<

constitutional ones.
practical kind,
at

Rather, they are

o£

the mo st

congress, says Mikva, Just

is

not good

interpreting the Constitution.

Mikva v
Abner

J.

Pich. r

Mikva, as a sitting federal
judge and

former u.S congressman from
Illinois,

is

in a position

to speak to both
constitutional interpretation and

congress' capacity for it.
"[for] the most part,

Mikva's judgment

is

that

legislative debate does not

explore the constitutional
implications of pending
legislation; and, at best, Congress
does an uneven job
of considering the constitutionality
of the statutes it

adopts.""

Consequently, Mikva suggests that Congress

uphold its oath of office and filter
out the clearly

unconstitutional but "the courts should examine
to the
fullest extent the constitutional implications
of every
piece of legislation."" Mikva offers this
extreme

la See Abner
J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?", p. 587.
19 See Abner
J.

Mikva, "How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?", p. 590.
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solution to the problem o£
Congress' supposed
incapacity in this area
without elaboration.
Does he
really mean sysij, plece o£
Ugislation? I s Congress
understanding of constitutionality
so little to be
depended upon? On the basis
of his experience,
apparently epitomized by the
three examples he offers,
Mikva concludes that
Congress. .has not been a model
of
constitutional decision making. ...
Its
en superficial and, for
the
Jo "oa t
self ~ serv ^g constitutional
debate
.....While congressional constitutional
debate aids the courts by identifying
issues
and motivations, it is not a
substitute
for
the judgment of the courts.
The courts must
a ? olitical role and make
tht harH
the
hard 5
decisions
Members of
should strive to be Jefferson's Congress
independent
guardians but should remember that the
system
was designed to give the courts
the final
20
.

Lu

say.

Not surprisingly, Fisher does not
agree with

Mikva's analysis.

He avoids the deeper pitfalls of

Mikva 's argument by reshaping the issue.

Mikva

concerns himself with who should have the "final
say."

Without defining final, he asserts that the Court
should have it.

Fisher, wisely, speaks instead in

terms of "contributions to constitutional meaning" and

participation by Congress in "constitutional

ao See Abner J. Mikva,

"How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?", p. 610-11.
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"

dialogue.Political

H e says,

..

Despite lnstitutional
and

notations shared with

the President and
the

courts,... congress can
perform an essential, broad,
and ongoing role in shaping
the meaning of the
Constitution aa
.

This is not a new role for
Congress.
Fisher
recalls that historically, both
the congress and the
executive has been instrumental
in determining

constitutional meaning.

Fisher offers

a

brief but

telling review of the doctrine
of "coordinate
construction" to "demonstrate that

Congress, by the

very nature of the political
system, shares with the
executive and the judiciary the duty
of constitutional

interpretation.""

Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln all

asserted executive constitutional
interpretation power
to some degree.
Fisher, looking at the example

of the

removal power shows that Congress'
interpretations have
greatly shaped the Court's judgment. 2 *
21

See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," North Caroiin,
Law Review 63 (1985):707.

^

22 See Louis
Fisher,

"Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 708.
22 See Louis
Fisher,

"Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 710-11.
24 See Louis
Fisher,

"Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 716.

Fisher's point

is not to set

Congress or the

Executive above the Court
in constitutional
interpretation but rather to
show that ..final"
an operative word in this
arena.

ls

not

••[Comments] by

Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln,
Taney, and Frankfurter
demonstrate that the Supreme
Court is

the -ultimate

interpreter' only when its
decisions have been accepted
as reasonable and persuasive
by the people and other
governmental units." 28
One of those governmental
units, Congress, for
example, continues to be unpersuaded
by the Court's

reasoning on the legislative veto.

According to

Fisher, within the first sixteen
months following the
Court's decision to strike them down,
Congress enacted
eighteen bills incorporating fifty-three
legislation

vetoes."

it is hard to see finality in this.

Fisher does not look for finality from either
the

Court or Congress.

He characterizes the issue as

not simply one of measuring the competence of
Congress against an ideal standard, but of
comparing legislative to judicial competence.
Because both branches have their strengths
and their weaknesses, an open dialogue
between Congress and the Courts is a more
fruitful avenue for constitutional

2D See Louis Fisher,

"Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 740.
a*

See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 725.

"
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b6lieVlng
l-JSKS'^JSS
yu5sess es ceS?
certain superior

that the

skills."

Reminding us that members
of Congress take an
oath of office to
defend and support the
Constitution and therefore
cannot ignore the
constitutional issue when
they legislate, Fisher
defends the authority and
competence of Congress
in the realm of
Constitutional interpretation.
A
particular strength of Congress
is fact-finding
and under the doctrine
of presumption of

constitutionality,- the Court
depends on Congress
for this.

"When the judiciary determines
that
legislators have chosen a 'rational
basis'
for

27
e
Louis Fisher,
,
rn
f f
Interpretation

"Constitutional
by Members of Congress,"
p. 722
y
Footnote omitted.
The doctrine of presumption of
constitutionality was respected more in its
breach than
in its observance during the
Lochner Era, the heyday of
the Court's use of substantive due
process doctrine^
Under substantive due process doctrine,
the
presuming legislation to be unconstitutional Court was
and
requiring that it pass often impossible
"constitutional
tests.
As the Court's authority began to erode
because of this activism against New Deal
legislation,
it took the institutionally protective
course of
deferring to Congress' view of constitutionality
by
questioning legislation except in certain cases. Thenot
Court continues to apply "strict scrutiny" in
cases
where legislation on its face infringes the Bill of
Rights, where the open political processes are impeded
and where legislation affects "discrete and insular
minorities
.

.

carrying out the commerce
power, for example, the
Court's investigation ceases.""
Mikva claims the structure
of Congress is such
that it cannot make
constitutional determinations.
Fisher, however, finds that
there are numerous
institutional mechanisms that
enable Congress to
participate in constitutional
interpretive practice.
He says that

Congressional hearings attract
testimony
administration witnesses, constitutional from
scholars, and representatives of
private organizations. Committee various
analyze constitutional questions staff can
and call on
the American Law Division of
the Library of
Congress which is staffed with
fifty attorneys specializing in approximately
different
subject areas.
The office of the Legislative
Counsel of the House and the Office
of the
Legislative Counsel of the Senate,
established to assist members in drafting
bills and resolutions, also provide
constitutional advice. 30
Members of Congress do not stop at Congress'
doors, however, when it comes to pushing their
views of

constitutionality.

Fisher calls it a "striking

development" that over the past decade more and more
members have turned to the courts for assistance. 31
29 See Louis
Fisher,

"Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 730.
30 See Louis Fisher,

"Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress,"

730
31 See Louis
Fisher,

p.

"Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 731.
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These cases carry with them
political questions and
standing to sue problems, however.
Legislators must
meet all the standing
requirements of any other
litigant but also must show that
they do not suffer
from an injury that can be
"redressed by their

colleagues acting through the regular
legislative
process
.

.

.

.

The political question and standing
to sue problem
does not enter another whole group
of cases, however.

Because these are those in which
Congress as an
institution pursues a case to the Supreme

Court.

Congress- interest in any case that
questions the

constitutionality of its legislation
always has standing to sue."

is clear,

it

since the whole Congress

and not just members of it are bringing suit,
the

redress to colleagues problem is resolved and only

constitutional questions remain in these cases.

In

these instances, Congress calls in its own

constitutional law offices.

33 See Louis Fisher,

"Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 730-31.
33 See R.

Lawrence Dessem, "Congressional Standing
to Sue: Whose Vote is This, Anyway?" Notre Dame Law
Review 62 1986) :1.
(

108

Traditionally, the Justice
Department has been
Congress- constitutional
law firm
It was the jofa Qf
the Solicitor General
to defend the
constitutionality
of legislation before
the Supreme Court.
This practice
began to change when the
executive in 1926 asserted
that there are two
circumstances under which the
Attorney General can decline
to defend a statute.
one case the President is
not required to defend
statutes that, in his opinion,
unconstitutionally
encroach on the authority or
powers of the president.
In the other case, the
president is not required to
defend statutes that are clearly
unconstitutional.
The
case law undergirding these
assertions is Myers v.
United States and Humphrey'* Exsrnhnr v.
UnitpH
.

m

States

.

3 *

i

n

Myers , the power of the President to

remove subordinates without interference
was at issue.
Here the Solicitor General argued for
the first time

that an act of Congress was unconstitutional.

The

Court agreed that the act in question
improperly eroded
the President's authority.

In Humphrey's Executor,

Solicitor General argued that the Federal Trade

Commission Act was unconstitutional
limit the President's removal power.

3«

272 U.S.

respectively.

52

construed to

if

The Court

(1926) and 295 U.S.

602

(1935)

the

disagreed and held the act's
restriction was
permissible. >» it was this changed
practice of the
Solicitor General of sometimes
attacking rather than

automatically defending federal
statutes that prompted
Congress to establish its own
constitutional law
offices in 1978.
Why Congress waited
so long is an

open question.
The issues that the executive has
chosen to attack
rather than defend have been anything
but trivial.
In
INS Y

t

CHAPHft , 36 the legislative veto was attacked.

In

this case, the Court declared the
legislative veto

unconstitutional.

The legislative veto was constructed

fifty years ago as an administrative efficiency
measure
to expedite New Deal legislation in response
to the

Depression.

It gave some "quasi-legislative" power to

the executive but retained an ultimate one or two-

house veto over decisions made thereunder.
In the last decade, Congress has concluded that it
is

essential that it have its own legal counsel to see
3B

See Editors Notes, "Equitable Discretion and
the Congressional Defense of Statutes," Yale Law
Journal 92 (1983) :970.
3*

INS v. Chariha. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
In this
case, the Court declared the legislative veto
unconstitutional. The legislative veto was constructed
fifty years ago as an administrative efficiency measure
to expedite New Deal legislation in response to the
Depression.
It gave some "quasi-legislative" power to
the executive but retained an ultimate one or two-house
veto over decisions made thereunder.

to xt that its
statute, are always
vigorously defended
before the Court.
Sur P ri slngly uttle

3cholarly
attention has been focused
on this change in
the
relationship between the
executive and legislative
departments nor the subsequent
use of the congressional
law offices to correct
the imbalance."
Even wlthln
Congress, only recently
have members learned of
the
existence of the offices
and understood their
responsibilities,
since part of the law
offices'
responsibilities is defending
members with legal
problems, the members often
hear about the law offices
the hard way, however. 38
The two offices, while
having virtually the same
structure and responsibilities,
blossomed from

different seeds.

The Office of the Senate
Legal

Counsel was statutorily created
by the "Ethics in
37 See
generally Louis Fisher,
interpretation by Members of Congress"Constitutional
,
"R. Lawrence
0
1 Standing t0 Su
Whose "2e is

^hir'Anv^^r^

^

-

Editors Notes, "Equitable Discretion
Ini fh^r
and
the Congressional Defense of
Statutes."

nter iew with Michael Travaglini of
_
the Office
of the Counsely to the Clerk on
August 8, 1988
I
conducted telephone interviews on April
19 and 20 and
August 3 and 8, 1988 with members of both
the House and
a
S
Mor 9 an Rankle, Assistant Counsel, of
:
fh2
the nL°
Office of! the
Senate Legal Counsel and Michael

*V

Travaglini were especially generous with their
time and
They both provided briefs, answered questions
themselves and sought answers from others where
necessary to provide the history and current picture
of
these two offices.
help.
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^

Government Act o£ 1978"

"
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At this same time,
there

«as a bill to create a
joint House-Senate Office
of
congressional Legal Counsel
but the appropriate
House
committees did not consider
the bill.
Because
the

House was not prepared
to agree to the creation
of the
Joint office, the bill was
later amended to create
only
the Office of senate Legal
Counsel.- The Office of
the counsel to the Clerk
which performs the same
duties
for the House has evolved
over the past decade through
a series of personnel
decisions
.

The Office of the Senate Legal
Counsel acts in the
Senate's name only when directed
to do so by a

resolution of the Senate and
consequently

is

clearly

the voice of the Senate when it
argues before the
Supreme Court.
The office is directly accountable
to
the Joint Leadership Group which
consists of the

President pro tempore of the Senate,
majority and
minority leaders of the Senate, chair and
ranking
minority members on the Committee of the
Judiciary of
the Senate and the chair and ranking minority
member of
39

Ethics in Government Act of 1978" - Public Law
95-521 CS. 555]; October 26, 1978. The Office of
the
Senate Legal Counsel was codified at 2 U.S.C. Sect.
288
(19 8 2)

II

i

.

*° See Footnote
p. 973.

Journal
1988.

3

in Editor's notes Yale Law

41 Interview
with Michael Travaglini April 19,

the committee of the
Senate which has
Jurisdiction over
the contingency funds
of the Senate.

The chartering statute
for the office requires
that, -tin] performing
any function under this
chapter,
the Counsel shall defend
vigorously..." the

constitutionality of acts of
Congress.- Unlike tne
other sections of this law,
Congress here uses the
words "shall defend vigorously"
in relation to the
defense of the constitutionality

of acts of Congress.

It is clear that Congress
was determined to have
in
Place its own effective mechanism
for its participation
in constitutional debate
with the Supreme Court.

The Office of the Senate Legal
Counsel consists of
the Counsel, a Deputy Counsel
and Assistant Counsels.
The position of Counsel has been
filled by only one

person in its brief history.

This Counsel came to the

office from tours as the Chief staff
Attorney for the
D.C. Circuit and as counsel to the
NAACP Legal Defense
Fund.
There have been three deputy counsels one from
Capitol Hill, one from an executive agency
and one from
a

trade association and work on Capital Hill,

one of

the current two assistant counsels was a judicial

clerk.

Others have come from the Department of Justice

and private practice.

An assistant counsel commented,

however, that while only two have come from private
*a

2

U.S.C. Sect. 288 (1982) at 584.
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.

Practice, they all could have
because the work
essentially that of a private
law firm.-

is

Because this office speaks
for the Congress as
a
whole when it defends the
constitutionality
of

legislation, it does not make
recommendations about
legislation. As noted earlier,
there are numerous
attorneys available to Congress
for that purpose.
The
appointments to the office are
nonpolitical as well.
The Counsel and Deputy Counsel
are appointed by the

president pro tempore of the senate
from among
recommendations submitted by the senate
majority and
minority leaders. The law commands
that the

appointments be made solely on the basis
of merit."
The Counsel and Deputy Counsel are
appointed for a term
that expires at the end of the congress
within
which

they are appointed but they may be reappointed.

Since

there has been only one Counsel in the life
of the

office and the senate has been in the hands of both
the

Democrats and the Republicans in that time,

it

is

fair

to say the nonpartisan nature of the office has
been

respected
Because the Counsel to the Clerk has been

established by a series of decisions made by the Bi-

partisan Group of the House rather than by statute, the
43 Interview with Morgan
Frankle August 3,
2

U.S.C. Sect. 288 (1982) at 575.

1988.

office has slightly

l

ess official standing.

its

history and the background
of its Counsel, Deputies
and
Assistants parallels that of
its senate counterpart,
however.
There have been two Counsels
to the Clerk in

its short life but the
current Counsel has held the

position almost since the inception
of the office and
rose to the post from the
position of Deputy Counsel.
The current House Counsel came
to the office from other
work on Capitol Hill.

The Deputy Counsel had three

years experience as an assistant
Senate Legal Counsel
before joining the House office. There
are two

Assistant House Counsels whose backgrounds
vary between
experience at the Justice Department and as
clerks for

the D.C. Circuit.

(Interestingly, one of the

clerkships was with Abner

Mikva.)

J.

The House office

also has a law clerk who began in the office as
a

paralegal before entering law school.

The work and the

structure of the office is that of most law firms.

difference

is

The

that the sole client of these offices is

the Congress of the United States.

This client has recently employed these two

offices to defend challenged legislation before the

Supreme Court in three landmark cases:

CHAPHA,« S

BOWSHER V.

+a

462 U.S.

4«

106 S.Ct.

919

S YNAR

(1983)

3181

(

*8
r

.

1986)

.

INS V.

and MORRISON V. OLSON ""*

"

the legislative veto,
the balanced budget
bill and
the independent counsel
cases respectively.

m

Re P"sentative Michael
Synar of Oklahoma
challenged the constitutionality
of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 immediately
B ° WShfir

'

upon its passage.

The act called for an
automatic

budget-cutting scheme that would
be administered by the
Comptroller General.
Synar charged that because the
Comptroller General is ultimately
removable
by

Congress, he/she could not play
what amounts to an
executive agency role since it would
breech separation
of powers principles.
in M^rJ^a, the establishment
of the Office of Independent
Counsel was challenged.
The felt need for the independence
of these counsels
arose in the aftermath of Watergate.
The special

prosecutor in that case, Archibald Cox,
was appointed
by the Attorney General and therefore
accountable to
him.

Ultimately, Cox was not fully free to carry
his
investigation as far as he felt it should go
and was

fired.

The independence of his successor was

guaranteed only by the word of the President.
established in this act

a

Congress

statutory foundation for the

independence of independent counsels.
Are these laws constitutional?

Congress says yes.

The legal briefs in these three cases provide the
108 S. Ct.

2597 (1987).

record of Congress-

interpretation of the Constitution
with regard to separation
of powers and delegation
of
authority doctrines, the
Appointments Clause, The
Necessary and Proper Clause,
and the Faithfully Execute
Clause.
The Supreme Court has agreed
only once with
Congress' interpretation in
these cases, but that is
not what is noteworthy here.

Our attention should be

on these briefs as the
outcome of Congress-

participation in Fisher's "constitutional
dialogue."
turn now to Congress- discourse
on the Constitution
revealed in these three cases.

I

Congressional Con stitutional Discourse

CHADHA presented the first constitutional
case of
major proportions presented to the House
and Senate law
offices.

Like the instances cited above, this was

another case of refusal by the Attorney General
to

defend the constitutionality of an act of Congress.
The case, ostensibly about the fate of a deportable

alien, more importantly questioned the

constitutionality of the legislative veto.

In his

dissenting opinion, Justice White called the case one
of

"surpassing importance" because declaring the

legislative veto unconstitutional "sounds the death

.

knell for nearly 200 other
statutory provisions In
which Congress has reserved
a "legislative

veto-.""

Clearly, a very important
case to be handed to
two
small law offices.
The House Counsel did in
this case
employ an additional attorney
in the person of
Eugene
Gressman of the University of
North Carolina School of
Law but the Office of Senate
Legal Counsel handled its
brief entirely in office,
when it came time for oral
argument before the Supreme
Court, the Senate Legal
Counsel, Michael Davidson, took
the entire time for
both offices since the statutory
basis of the Senate
office was felt to give more
authority to his position.
This practice was also followed
for the same reason in
the case of the independent counsel,
MorrMnn
n
y

}

~n

discussed subsequently
The Senate Legal Counsel and the Counsel
to the

Clerk comprise the voice of the Congress
before the
Supreme Court.
When a case is underway on the Senate
side, members of the Joint Leadership Group
are kept

apprised of the arguments and have opportunity for
input into them although the greatest contribution
is
4a

INS V,

Chfld.ha.,

462 U.S.

919

(1983) at 967.

*• Asked if there is any thought in the
House of
giving statutory authority to the Counsel to the Clerk
as the House's voice at the Supreme Court, Michael
Travaglini responded that the Bi-Partisan Group is
satisfied with the current status and process.
Interview August 8, 1988.

-de

118

by the attorneys in
the office."

On the House
side, weekly meetings
occur to keep the
Bi-Partisan
Group informed and in a
position to give input as
well,
in some cases (most
recently the independent
counsel
case), members of the minority
party will withdraw

support for a posited legal
argument and ask that their
names be removed from the
brief if the argument is

pursued.-

However,

it

is still

briefs represent Congress-

fair to say that these

interpretation of the

Constitution in the same sense that
non-unanimous
legislation is Congress- policy
choice.

Congress'

interpretation of its powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause and its
interpretation
of

the separation of powers and delegation
of authority

doctrines are in the House and Senate party
briefs
filed in CJiMHA.
At issue in this case is the question
as to whether the legislative veto is
a constitutional

means of implementing the power of Congress over
the
admission of aliens.
Both the Immigration and

Naturalization Service and Jagdish Rai Chadha, the
deportable alien, argued that this use of the
legislative veto unconstitutionally infringed the
so Interview
with Morgan Frankle,

August

3,

1987.

sx In the independent
counsel case, The Speaker
and Leadership Group consisted of The Honorable Jim
Wright, Speaker of the House of Representatives; The

Honorable Thomas S. Foley, Majority Leader; and The
Honorable Tony Coelho, Majority Whip.

constitutional powers of the
executive.

Section 244 of
the immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952
provides
for a sharing of some of
the authority over
deportable
aliens but ultimate authority
stays in Congress.
Does
the Constitution allow this?
Congress says yes.
In its senate brief,

Congress argues that the

Presentation and Bicameralism
Clauses do not apply ln
this case because they are fully
satisfied by the
underlying statute authorizing
legislative review."
Congress strongly objected to the
Supreme Court's

considering the constitutionality
of

a

"generic"

legislative veto and urged that the
Court limit its
opinion to the use of the legislative
veto in the

circumstances of the instant case.

Consequently, the

Senate brief concentrates its argument
on the

constitutionality of the legislative veto in
regard to
deportable aliens only. Calling on precedent,
the

brief argues that the legislative veto should
be judged

by the test set out in Nixon

general Service* 3

v.

A dmi n

i

*hr^n r

of

and that the legislative veto used

a2

INS V. Ghfltihfl/ Docket No. 80-1832, Brief of the
United States Senate, Appellee-Petitioner, p. 33.
03

Nixon V, Administrator of Ge neral ServirP* 433
425 (1977).
"[The] proper inquiry focuses on the
extent to which [the act] prevents the Executive Branch
from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions [and if it does] whether that impact is
justified by an overriding need to promote objectives
within the constitutional authority of Congress."
Nixon at 443.
U.S.

r

here passes that test.
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"it augments, and in no
manner

infringes upon, executive

power.—

Tne Senate Legal
Counsel leaves to the Counsel
to the Clerk the
constitutional arguments regarding
separation of powers
and delegation of authority
doctrines generally. The
Senate joins the House brief by
its endorsement of it.
While the House Office of Counsel
to the Clerk

does not have statutory foundation,
its intervention in
Qh&lhsL was agreed to unanimously by House

resolution."

In its brief,

the House Counsel fleshed out
Congress'

interpretation of separation of powers
doctrine.
Congress argues that
[The] Constitution does not say that
the
three great functions shall at all times
be
kept separate and independent of each
other,
or that the three functions can never
be
blended or mixed or delegated as among the
three Branches. The notion of total
separation of the powers central or
essential' to the operation of the three
great departments is an illogical and
impractical formulation of the separation
doctrine, not a constitutional command. Bs
%

Not only does Congress say it is not unconstitutional
for there to be some "mixing and blending,"

there is a positive good in this.
a+

it asserts

The concept of separation

See Senate Brief, p. 28.

SB See Brief of the
United States House of
Representatives, Appellee-Petitioner, p. Ill of INS v.
CHAD HA-

See Senate Brief, p. 22.

"

"
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must be the

oio^.

one which is pragmatic and
flexible."

in the court's

opinion, Justice White is
chided for

replacing efficiency for
constitutionalism.-

We can see

Congress here constructing the
argument that identifies the
efficient or pragmatic and flexible
with the constitutional.
It is a call to an understanding
that uses contemporary
usage so that the document "lasts
the ages
.

The House brief offers its own
vocabulary of

constitutionalism.

it moves

from "separation of powers-

language to that of a "blended form of
government."
"[at] the core of this 'blended-

form of government

And
is

the

legislating body, the Congress of the United
States. »»•
Certainly, there remain separate tasks for the
three

branches but within those tasks, the Constitution
has

authorized Congress, through the Necessary and Proper
Clause* 0 "to blend and mix, in statutory form, the
various
powers of government, and to delegate some of its own

legislative functions to Executive officers and agencies
Ultimately, then, Congress

is

See Senate Brief, p. 23.

38

INS v. Chadha

462 U.S.

919

(1983) at 944-45.

See Senate Brief, p. 24.
so United States
Constitution Article I, Sect. 8.,
CI. 18.
Congress shall have the power "to make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying

into Execution the foregoing powers...."
s:L

sx

arguing that the separation of

S7

r

.

See Senate Brief, p. 24.

—
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powers concept must be
understood not as dividing
"the
branches into watertight
compartments" but rather "to

permit
that degree of intergovernmental
cooperation considered
'necessary and proper- for effective
government
.

Efficiency is, Congress claims,

a

constitutional standard.

We can also see in
Q^dJia Congress-

interpretation of

the Necessary and Proper clause
in regard to the delegation
of authority.
Here, Congress depends upon
John Marshall's
rUle in «gCm i Q*h v
^rvlmn for its understanding of this
clause" and concludes that the delegation
of

its authority

is an

"appropriate means" toward the legitimate
end, in this
case, of dealing with deportable
aliens.
"The short of it
is that Congress may use its
'necessary and
proper' powers

so as to delegate to others some, all
or none of its plenary

legislative power ...[ and

]

it may place conditions and

limitations on any such delegation.

...

Having delegated the power, what happens to it?
is,

That

has Congress "given it away" such that what was

originally legislative power

is

now executive power?

If

this is the case, then the legislative veto clearly has

separation of powers problems.

Congress cannot intervene in

the executive's exercise of its own powers.
62

See Senate Brief, p. 27.

3

See Senate Brief, p. 36.

e *

See Senate Brief, p. 36.

fi

This according
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to Congress is not, however,
what happens when congressional

authority

is

delegated.

Congress holds that

^

necessarily follows that when legislative
nnu
f
natUre has been delegated to another
department or executive officer, the
power
exercised by the delegatee retains its
legislative
or quasi-legislative nature.
One who receives
some part of the legislative power
through the
sweep of the Necessary and Proper
Clause does not
exercise that power by virtue of the
Executive
power to execute the laws of the United
One exercises quasi-legislative power. ss States.

S™V

On Congress' reading of the delegation
authority, therefore,

the power being exercised, by whatever
department or agent,

remains

a

legislative power and therefore Congress is

clearly within its power not only to attach strings
but to
pull them as well.
In its briefs, Congress has articulated its own

interpretation of two fundamental constitutional doctrines
-

separation of powers and delegation of authority.

-

While

the briefs, of course, call on past Court opinions, what is
of primary significance is that they also construct their

own theories.

Their arguments are based on Congress

theories of constitutionalism.

1

s

Congress is arguing here

that constitutional principles be defined in today's terms.

While not repudiating original intent theory, Congress would

qualify it as not apt in those situations that the Framers
could not have conceived.

For instance, the situation of a

huge administrative state apparatus that requires power to

"B

See Senate Brief, p. 37.
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run but brakes on that
power as well.
Congress does not
argue simple expediency.
it ties its argument to
the
constitutional text and its history.
it interprets the

Constitution and bases its actions
on that interpretation.
As far as Congress is concerned,
the legislative

veto is not

simply efficient, it is constitutional.

Constitutional in

some measure, however, b^ajise.
it is efficient.

This would

be part of Congress' constitutional
standard.

Looking at the example of Bowsher

v.

Synfir

one could

argue that Congress sees itself as
subservient to the Court
on the Constitution.
Qhs&hsL, however, is support for
Congress' claim of full competence to read
the Constitution
for itself.

Here, Congress has articulated its own

interpretation.

Even though the Court has not embraced this

interpretation, Congress has continued to use legislative
vetoes. ss

Does this mean Congress has the final say?

Or,

does this just mean the dialogue is ongoing?

Another example of Congressional constitutional

dialogue with the Supreme Court comes in Morrison
the independent counsel case.

v.

Olsen.

At issue in this case is

whether Congress can require that independent counsels be

appointed by the courts when the Attorney General determines
their need. The mechanism for this appointment comes in the

Ethics in Government Act of 1978 which establishes the

me See Louis Fisher,

Members of Congress,"

p.

"Constitutional Interpretation by
740.
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office and duties of the
independent counsels.
it is the
constitutionality of this act that
is challenged.
Congress
is not a party in this
case and therefore
filed

briefs.

These briefs reveal Congressinterpretation of the
Faithful Execution and Appointments
Clauses.
in the brief submitted by
the House, Counsel notes
that
this act has been re-authorized
twice and signed into law

three times by the President.

This triple endorsement,

according to Congress, comes from
"Congress- careful
consideration of the constitutional

issues.—

Congress

wants the Court to know that it does
not just hope the act
is constitutional, it believes
it is.
"Based
on

overwhelming evidence of both constitutional
legitimacy and
suitability of the means to the legislative
purpose,

Congress passed the Ethics Act in 1978. "«•
Congress' constitutional arguments, here, therefore,
are neither tentative nor elaborate.

appointment power in courts of law?

Can Congress vest

Clearly, yes.

The

7

Article II, Sect. 1, CI. 8.
"Before he enter on the
Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or
Affirmation: -- 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully execute the office of President of the United
•»
States
Article II, Sect. 2, CI. 2.
"...Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments."

*

Morrison v. Olson r Docket No. 87-1279, Brief of the
Speaker and Leadership Group of the House of
Representatives, amici curiae at 12.
See Brief of the Speaker and Leadership Group of the
House of Representatives, p. 12.
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Constitution says, "...the
Congress may by Law vest
the
Appointment of such inferior
officers, as they think
Proper... in the Courts of
Law...."- shoul(J

^

be read as to be limiting
in Congress- authority?
Certalniy
not.
It
strains credulity to suggest
"
that the Pramers
would have chosen that phrase
if they meant the Clause
to
Place unstated limits on what
types of appointment could be
vested [in this alternative ].
In addition to reading the
text of the document,

the

Senate in its brief returns to
the Kramers' debates to
underscore Congress- reading of the
Appointments Clause.

Congress would remind the Court that
extensive debate took
Place regarding the power of appointment.
The extension of
the power of appointment to the courts
through
the

legislature was

a

deliberate act that was intended not just

to promote "beneficial appointments" but
also to preserve

the balance in government."^

This obviously comports well

with Congress' view of the separation of powers
doctrine

discussed earlier.

The act looks to the Attorney General to

call for the independent counsel and then looks to the

courts to appoint one who

is

independent of the branch she

will investigate.
o

See Brief of the Speaker and Leadership Group of the
House of Representatives, p. 12.
-t

71 See Brief of the
Speaker and Leadership Group of the
House of Representatives, p. 12.

72 See Senate Brief,
p.

25.

,

How independent the counsel

is

to be raised a further

constitutional question that elicited
Congress- reading of
the Faithful Execution Clause.
The challengers of the act
claimed that unless the President
has full authority over
all in his chain of command, he
cannot faithfully
execute

his duties.

This assertion, says Congress,
is based on a
misreading of the Faithful Execution
Clause as an expansion
rather than a limitation on executive
power.
"By its

wording and history, the Faithful Execution
Clause exists
primarily to limit Executive power, and not

as a basis for

the Executive to have laws struck down." 73

Even so,

Congress is sensitive to the principle that no act
of
Congress can infringe on the executive's ability to

accomplish its assigned functions.

Therefore, vesting

removal power for good cause in the Attorney General

respects this principle.

"Vesting solely that power of

selection in the courts in order to guarantee impartiality
and ensure public confidence in no way "prevents the

Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned

"'7

f unctions

Government Act

is

*

Whether or not the Ethics in

constitutional

is no longer a

debatable

issue as far as the Court and Congress are concerned.

Both

agree that it is.
73 Morrison v.

Olson Docket No. 87-1279, Brief of the
United States Senate as amicus curiae at 36.
,

74 See Brief of the United States Senate as amicus
cur iae p. 46.
Footnote omitted.

both

^^^

Ch^ and
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Congress
own reading of the
Constitution to defend the

constitutionality of its act, r„
*u
acts, in CJiadiia,
in spite of the
Courts disagreement,
Congress continues to
believe

^

legislative vetoes are
constitutional and continues
to act
°" that
rather than cainng

m

B^H^^s^,

the text of the
Constitution, Congress' briefs
are based
solely on appeals to
Supreme Court precedent.
Congress

^

offers no independent
constitutional theories here.
The
balanced budget statute,
itself, was also different
from the
other two discussed here.
Within the statute was
provision that its constitutionality
could be immediately
tested in court and that the
Supreme Court could not decline
to take the appeal."73

^

Sowsher and Chadha give mixed signals
about Congress'
deference to the Court as the
ultimate authority on the
Constitution.
I
turn now to that issue in the
conclusion of
this chapter.
Conclus on
i

This chapter argues that Congress can
and does

interpret the Constitution for itself.
of that

The new articulators

interpretation are Congress' constitutional law

offices, the Offices of the Senate Legal Counsel
and Counsel

73 Congressional
Qua rterly.

Inn.

r

February

8,

1986,

.
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to the Clerk.

Congress established these
offices to protect
its institutional interests
before the Supreme Court
but
they serve a broader purpose
as well.
They provide the one
voice of congress on constitutional
interpretation that
Abner Mikva, among others, claims
it does not have.
Mikva
says Congress cannot interpret
the Constitution because
its

structure and political interests do
not allow this.
These
offices, however, do gather the
constitutional thoughts of
the Congress and bring them together
in one articulate

whole
This is not to say that Congress is
participating in
interpretation for the first time when the
offices do this,

however.

Far from it.

From the beginning, Congress has

interpreted the Constitution in the performance
of its work.
Every act of Congress must be seen as an instance
of

Constitutional interpretation.

What these offices provide

through their briefs that is new is the record of Congress'

constitutional seasoning.

The briefs are the result of the

ongoing process of constitutional interpretation by Congress
that has been mistakenly discounted in the past.
The briefs of the law offices are the voice of

Congress.

Just as we can take an opinion of the Supreme

Court and say, this is the Court speaking on the

Constitution, we can take the briefs of the Senate Legal
Counsel and the Counsel to the Clerk and say this

Congress speaking on the Constitution.

is

Before, it was
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debatable which constitutional
theory offered on the
floor
of Congress was the
constitutional theory behind
the
legislation.
Now Congress has a mechanism
through which to
make clear the constitutional
theory that undergirds its
legislation.
Were Congress to resort to the
use of court-

curbing bills, instead, we would
know that Congress had
rejected the Court's reasoning but
not what reasoning
Congress would offer instead.
Court-curbing
bills,

therefore, are a weapon against the
Court, but not a
positive contribution to constitutional
interpretation.
Congress does, however, make an important
positive

contribution through its constitutional law
offices.
Walter Murphy recently characterized the

debate between

democracy and judicial review as "misguided."'' 8

He said it

was misguided because it looks for a universal
answer to who

should be ultimate interpreter.

Murphy suggests, instead,

"modified version of departmentalism."

His departmentalism

would
[lower] the stakes by ascribing different
areas of competence - areas whose borders
shift over time. Thus, if widely accepted,
this form of departmentalism would reduce,
though not eliminate, conflict between the
federal judiciary, on the one hand, and
Congress and/or the presidency on the other.
Moreover, by decreasing the scope of judicial
authority to bind other branches of the
federal government, it underlines the value,

7<s

See Walter Murphy, "Who Shall Interpret? The Quest
for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter." The Review of
Politics 48 (1986) :401-23.

a

T

eC
ity/
° f reason in Persuading other
br^Lh
branches to accept
any particular
constitutional interpretation. 77

This echoes Fisher's
"constitutional dialogue" that
calls on all branches to come
to their own

constitutional interpretations rather
than simply to
defer to the Court.
Congress does this.

it is yet unpersuaded by
the

reasoning of the Court on the
legislative veto, for
example, and chooses not to defer
to the judiciary
there.

Congress claims this as one of its
"areas of
competence,
but it is apparently less sure of
its own
••

reasoning on the balanced budget act and

reasoning of the Court there.

is open to the

On the other hand,

Congress is most confident that it knows what
the

Constitution means in the Appointments Clause and

confidently shares its thinking with the Court there.
Fisher's model of constitutional interpretation as

dialogue and Murphy's of a modified departmentalism
help explain the role of Congress which has been

institutionalized by the law firms.

Congress, through

its constitutional law offices, appears to have put

these theories to work.

7,7

See Walter Murphy, "Who Shall Interpret? The
Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter,"
p.

417.
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° INSTITUTIONAL FAITHTESTTMnMv
^2
TESTIMONY BEFORE
THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
ELECTIONS OF THE CONNECTICUT
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Connecticut

is

the "Constitution State."

it

claims to have written
the first American charter
of
government
The Fundamental Orders
long before the
colonies ever conceived of
themselves as states.
So
precious was this charter to
Connecticut colonists that
they risked their lives to
protect it from

-

-

royal

revocation.

when King Charles II of England
decided to

revoke The Fundamental Orders,
the most liberal charter
of all the colonies, he
sent his royal governor,
Sir

Edmund Andross, to retrieve the
document.

Sir Edmund

was received with great ceremony
by the citizens of

Connecticut on the night of his arrival.
table,

the charter was placed before
him.

Seated at

a

Almost

immediately, all the candles in the room
were blown
out.

When they were re-lighted, the charter
was no

where to be found -- and continued to be
hidden from
the king ever after.

People in Connecticut take

constitutions very seriously.

1

1

Per interview with staff reference librarian of
the Connecticut Historical Society on April 26, 1990.

Introduction

When,

in 1985,

Connecticut was called upon to
be
the 33rd (or 34th and deciding)
state to jo in the

call
for a second Constitutional
Convention, the Committee
on Government Administration
and Elections (CAE) of the

General Assembly held hearings at
three locations in
the state to elicit the thoughts
of its
citizens.

While hearings themselves are not
unusual in
Connecticut, multiple hearings on one

issue, as well as

holding hearings outside the capital
of Hartford, are.
The number and political mix of
speakers

on both sides

were unusual as well.
I.

They ran the gamut from Thomas

Emerson, Lines Professor of Constitutional
Law

Emeritus at Yale University to the state's
senators to
heads of interest groups to a naturalized citizen
who,

in broken English,

expressed a strong personal sense of

the Constitution.

There were liberals and

conservatives on both sides of the issue.

2

2

Betty Tianti who is Secretary Treasurer of the
state AFL-CIO said, "I would say when you get people,
when you get organizations such as the Business
Roundtable and the AFL-CIO, former Defense Secretary
Laird, Roy Ash, many conservatives who have joined with
the liberal progressives, if you will, then I think we
have a good position." See the Record of the Testimony
Before the Government Administration and Elections
Committee, The Joint Standing Committee of the
Connecticut General Assembly. March 18, 1985, p. 605.
The following references to this testimony will be
referred to as GAE Testimony, date and page only.

The call for a second
constitutional convention
grew out of a desire of some to
amend the Constitution
to require a balanced budget.
Since the Senate had
failed to propose this amendment,
its supporters were
left with the larger task of getting
34 states to agree
to consider the idea in a constitutional
convention.

Consequently, the debate over a balanced budget

amendment expanded to the larger issue of

a

convention

with all the attendant uncertainty of whether

amendments would be limited to balancing the budget.

Anxiety over a second constitutional convention that
might do as the first and throw out the operating rules
of government lead most who testified in Connecticut
to

ignore the issue of balancing the budget and instead to
fight the idea of reconsidering the Constitution.
The testimony against the convention call far

outweighed that in favor of it.
organized coalitions, however.

Both sides had well
Most of those in

support spoke to the economics of a balanced budget

amendment while those opposed concentrated on the

Constitution itself.

It is this latter testimony that

reveals the intense visceral attachment to the document
that speaker after speaker referred to as "sacred."

A

remarkable depth of feeling is captured in the

testimony before the General Assembly committee.
testimony epitomizes what Sotirios Barber calls

This

"constitution Handedness" and
what Louis Flsher and
Walter Murphy call for as
an essentlal
whole practice of
Constitutional interpretation,
it is
the kind of political
activity John Brigham
points to
popular interpretive practice.
The frequent use of
the religious metaphor
in the testimony also
draws this
activity into the orbit of
Sanford Levinson who speaks
of "constitutional faith." 3

^^^

«

There is little evidence
other than Fourth of July
celebrations of popular American
interest in and
commitment to the Constitution,
it is usually as taken
for granted and ignored as
it is cherished.
Were one
to try to measure the
"constitution mindedness" or

"constitutional faith" of the American
people, as
opposed to the courts with their
written opinions, one
would be hard pressed to locate the
evidence.

Perhaps,

this is the reason political scientists
have been

remiss in documenting these politics and
understanding

them as constitutional interpretive practice.
Consequently, this testimony before the committee
of

^

0
103
a be
Qn Wnflt
Constitution
M-«n/ fnfTf
5 London:
f
f'
(Baltimore and
nsflns
Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1984); Louis Fisher, Constitutio nal di a lnm,P*
r
,

(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1988); Walter Murphy, "Who shall Interpret? The Quest
for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter," The
Review pf Politics 48 (1985) :401-23; John Brigham, The
Cult of the Court (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1987); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1988).
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the Connecticut General
Assembly offers a rare

opportunity to hear Americans,
most of whom disclaim
any special competence in
interpretation,

explain what

£HfiX think the Constitution means.

Testimony, under oath or otherwise,
provides a
special documentation of what people
believe.
L.H.
LaRue recently explored the testimony
before the United
States House Judiciary Committee
considering
the

impeachment of Richard M
affair.

.

Nixon during the Watergate

He turned to this testimony as
evidence of how

we understand ourselves as a people.

Politicians,

reasons LaRue, are experts in knowing what
can be said
publicly and thus he looked at the House Judiciary

Committee's testimony for judgments about who we
are as
a people.

In the same way,

the testimony in

Connecticut also gives us insight into, in LaRue
words, "our character and our aspirations." 4

similar to LaRue's,

I

's

in a vein

look at the text of the testimony

before a committee of the Connecticut General Assembly
to take account of popular political discourse

surrounding the Constitution.

This testimony, given in

Connecticut but drawn from national leaders, gives us
insight into popular attitudes toward the Constitution.

While sometimes attitudes toward the law have little
4

See L.H. LaRue, Political Discourse: A Case
Study of the Watergate Affair (Athens, Georgia:
University of Georgia Press, 1988).

.

affect on how the law

is

handled by those in charge
of
it,- in this case, popular
attitudes are determinative.
The attitude of most of
those testifying in Connecticut
is "hands off the
Constitution." This attitude
prevailed. While this chapter
is not concerned with
the ramifications of that
perspective, it certainly
raises questions for democratic
theorists.
The issue of a constitutional
convention brought
out more who have a deep
"constitutional faith" than
those who are committed to a specific
economic theory.
"Constitutional faith," a term coined by
Sanford

Levinson in his book of the same name,
is,
"wholehearted attachment to the Constitution
as the
center of one's (and ultimately the nation's)

political

life."«

Levinson wonders who, when confronted with an
opportunity to affirm a commitment to the Constitution

actually takes the oath seriously.

When we raise our

hand in affirmation in order to get a passport, for
example, are we thinking of the Constitution or of the

new horizons to which the passport is the ticket?
See John Brigham, "Bad Attitudes:
Survey
Research, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Practice."
Paper presented to panels on "Public Discourse and Law:
the Role of the Citizen," Midwest Political Science
Association, April 13-15, 1989; and "Legal Culture and
Legal Claims," Law and Society Meetings, Madison,
Wisconsin, June 8-11, 1989.
•

p.

4

See Sanford Levinson, Constitut ional Faith

r

implicitly, Levinson assumes
the latter.
Consequently,
he encourages a
constitutional "conversation"
within
the American polity that
would take more seriously
the
implications of the oath as well
as the document
itself.
Levinson would, no doubt, be
encouraged by the
number of people in Connecticut
who already take that
document very seriously. He
might, however, be
troubled by the obvious reluctance
of those same people
to "risk" a formal conversation
on it.
People
in

Connecticut came out on three occasions
and at times
stayed all day and far into the night
to have the

opportunity to give testimony on the call
for
constitutional convention.
"trembled."

They "feared."

a

They

They came to "protect" the Constitution.

The irony, however,

is that they came to protect

it

from the people.
The testimony in Connecticut mirrors the
tensions
the written document produced at its birth.

James

Madison and Thomas Jefferson squared off on the issue
of reverence for the Constitution as the ink was drying

and came down on different sides.

Madison, spurred by

concerns for stability, urged a respect for the

Constitution that would evince itself in a diffidence
toward the document that eschewed change.

7

Jefferson

would love the document by having each generation make
7

See Federalist 49.

.

it

peculiarly its own.

He would love the
process of

constitutionalism over its product."
Those who
prevailed in Connecticut were
squarely behind Madison.
Yet, the Constitution,

unreflective veneration.

itself, does not require
an

While in the hierarchy of

constitutional authority in popular
culture, the people
are, paradoxically, on the
bottom, the oeool. have the
final say on the document.
As political scientists,
we
should be attentive to how they
think and talk about
it.
The deference paid to the courts
in the
area of

constitutional interpretation has discouraged
the "nonexpert" from voicing her own views.
The testimony
before the Connecticut General Assembly
committee,

therefore, offers a rare opportunity to hear
people
speak on the Constitution and have their
views

recorded
While these hearings were held in Connecticut,

they represent more than the parochial concerns of that
state.

By the time Connecticut brought up the proposal

of a convention for consideration,

32 out of a

necessary 34 states had voted to call the convention.
Connecticut and Michigan considered the proposal at the
same time with either one possibly being the deciding
state.

•

p.

11.

Consequently, there were national forces

See Sanford Levinson, Constitut ional Faith

,

organized for and against
the call which came to
Connecticut to testify. The
chief proponent was the
National Taxpayers Union.
The chief opponent was a
coalition of well established
groups' called the
"Committee to Save the Constitution."
There were also
a number of individual
national organizations which
sent representatives to
Connecticut to
speak for and

against the call for a convention.

The testimony from

out of state speakers included
that from such figures
as Fay Wattleton, President of
Planned Parenthood of

America who spoke in opposition as
did Judy Goldsmith,
then-President of the National Organization
for Women

and Pierre duPont, former governor of
Maryland and

future presidential candidate who spoke in
support of
the convention.
The speakers were not representative of the

American public at large.

While the record shows

several dozen names of "average citizens" who did
not
wait until after one o'clock in the morning to testify,
on the whole, those who spoke did so for themselves as

well as for some group.

What we heard in Connecticut

was the polished voice of the well organized interest

• Most prominent among these groups were Common
Cause, the National Organization for Women, Planned
Parenthood, and the American Civil Liberties Union.

.
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group.-

The speakers display a
striking

constitutional consciousness,

what is most striking

about this constitutional
consciousness

is

that it is

consistently expressed in the
language of religious
faith.

This language reflects a deep
concern for the
Constitution that evinces itself in
an attitude
of

reverence and protective respect toward
the document
what Madison called a "wonderful
veneration" leading

-

toward stability and Jefferson called
"sanctimonious

reverence" leading toward ossification.^

This urge to

protect, however, inhibits constitutional
debate and,
in the extreme, paradoxically, makes the
Constitution

an impediment to the democracy it defines.

For many of

the speakers, a transposition has taken place making
the Constitution -- the document as it is -- not a

product of democracy but rather the democracy itself.
Just as "democracy" as an issue is settled, not open to

discussion, this transposition has removed the

Constitution from genuine debate.
Genuine discussion

is what

in Constitutional Di alogues 12
.

Louis Fisher calls for
He argues that more

xo Interestingly, this voice often
spoke
derisively of interest groups. Apparently, in this
area, it does not take one to know one.
11 See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith

pp. 9-10.
12 See generally Louis Fisher,
Constitutional

Dialogues

than the Supreme Court should
form, air, and act on
interpretations of the Constitution.
He, l ike Walter
Murphy, envisions a sharing of
ultimate authority by
the three branches depending
upon the context. Fisher
has gone beyond the hypothetical,
however, to show that
this sharing of ultimate interpretive
power is, in
fact, the way the American
constitutional system

actually works.

Fisher's insight and evidence
threaten
the myths surrounding what John
Brigham calls
the "cult

of the court."

The image of a singular hold on
the

document by the Court weakens under Fisher's
examination.
good.

This, according to Brigham,

is all to the

He argues that

...the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
have become fundamental to modern political
life and appreciated as characteristics of a
"civilized humanism." The promise of
constitutional interpretation is that it
attempts to keep this humanism alive.
Constitutional interpretation dominated by
the Supreme Court truncates that promise. 13

While Fisher is concerned chiefly with calling upon all
three branches to be constitutional interpreters, he,
like Brigham, claims the role for the people as well.

Sotirios Barber, even more direct in his appeal for
popular "constitution mindedness," argues that
At some point the nation has to see and
aspire to its better self. Courts can help
13 See John Brigham,

232.

Footnote omitted.

The Cult of the Court, p.

.

bUt h8y cannot really
command
^
ih«H$
obedience
to the Constitution because
it is
f Uy t0 Underst
conformity'^
*^
the Constitution
£he°cons^
?
as a thing commanded...:
an
mply teU us the m ^ning of [A]
t^l r°
^t I
this
Constitution;
we have to see it for
ourselves.
Courts cannot achieve a
Constitutional state of affairs on
their
own. 1 *

Article V of the Constitution invites
the people
to come together in a constitutional
convention to have
a dialogue or, in Sanford
Levinson's
words, a

conversation on the Constitution.

The majority of

those testifying in Connecticut, however,
would forgo
that opportunity.
Not out of apathy certainly but

rather because of a sense that the Constitution
has

sacredness about it that closes
debate.

It,

a

it off from public

like a religious text, is to be known but

not rewritten.

It,

like a religious text, has been

handed down to us; written by others of a higher order
who have never again been among us.

There is an interesting dichotomy between those
who favor a convention and those who oppose it.

Those

who favor a convention do not treat the text as sacred.

Those who oppose it do.

Thomas Emerson, who opposes a

convention call, is typical in his approach saying that
I
am testifying here today on behalf of the
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union. The
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union has not
taken a position on the merits of a balanced

x«

Means

See Sotirios Barber, On What the Constitution
p.

213.

r
C ° nCerned vn
* ••«lo»ly,
however w^h
nowever,
with the procedure involved
in an
bala C the bud ^ et th^ugS
?he
process
P^cesTof'a"
of a constitutional
? !
convention."

^

On the other side, the
fear is instead about larger

deficits.

Scott Palmer, Executive Director
of the
Taxpayers Foundation was worried
about the growing
deficit rather than the Constitution.
He argued that
S
reCOrds show that... civilizations
So
go thrin^
through various stages and one
of
stages they go through right before the
they fall
is when their institutions
are captured bv
special interest (sic) and by
bureaucracy and
S
S6 V
hG people wh0 created them.
?hf
L?°
J Budget
n $
The Balanced
Amendment ... is our chance
to arrest and reverse that
process
it's
our chance to pull ourselves out of
the fire
and keep on going as a free country. 16

The proponents of the convention discuss
the issue

essentially in the context of economic necessity.

When

they discuss the Constitution specifically, they
do so
to point out the "safeguards" that would keep
the

convention from "running away."

Throughout their

testimony, they are on the defensive and ultimately
fail to prove their case to the committee.

Consequently, the proposal for a second constitutional

convention was killed in committee and never debated by
the full Connecticut General Assembly.

The reason for

their defeat is of little interest here but most

probably due to the nature of the by-partisan coalition
1B See GAE Testimony,

3/18/85, p. 506.

16 See GAE Testimony,

3/28/85. p.

569.

Put together by the opponents.

Both labor and business

organizations joined with feminist
groups
the National Abortion
Rights League

l

ike NOW and

and ant i -feminists

groups like the Eagle Forum
to oppose the convention
call.
addition, the leadership of
the proponents
reportedly overplayed its hand
and alienated

m

some of

its potential

supporters.-

of popular politics,

Consequently, on the level

this drama was a predictable
one.

On the level of constitutional
politics,

however,

it

offers an unusual opportunity
for us to hear the
Constitution seriously discussed by
other than judges.
This is what is of interest here.
The opponents to the call for a
convention set the

tone and formulated the language of the
discussion.

They cast the testimony in the mold of
religious faith.
What is remarkable about this testimony is

both what is

said and who

is

saying

it.

These espousers of

traditionally conservative arguments are most often
leading liberals.

Taking

t he

Constitution Seriously

The Joint Standing Committee on Government

Administration and Elections of the Connecticut General

"
Fight."

See "GOP Says Bush Lost, Dole Won in Amendment
The Hartford Courant May 5 (1985):D1.

Assembly opened its hearings
at 11 a.m. on March
1985 in the Senate Chambers of
the Capitol

1 8/

in Hartford.

Then-Connecticut Senator Lowell P.
Weicker was the
first to testify which he did
by telephone from
Washington.
He set the tone of urgency
and fear when
he said "that it is nothing
less than the Constitution
of the United States that is
at stake here.-while

reluctant to breech the separation of
federal/state
authority, Connecticut's then-junior
senator,

Christopher Dodd, nevertheless also felt
called upon to
lend his voice to the opposition, reasoning
that
"...because of the nature of the issue, obviously
the
decision on whether or not to hold a constitutional
convention.

..

is a matter which involves the Federal

Constitution, and therefore

I

think tit] highly

appropriate to have members from the Federal
legislature in this state to appear before you and to
express their views." 1 *
Like Weicker, Dodd feared for the result of a

second constitutional convention and, calling the

Constitution "our most fundamental document," said
"Thus, by whatever accident of history [you have] the

power to decide whether this issue is of such

significance that we must put our very United States
18 See GAE Testimony,
19

3/28/85, p. 436.

See GAE Testimony, 3/28/85, p. 530.

Constitution at risk.

The stakes are beyond

calculation.-

Later in his testimony/
Dodd referred
to his "great reverence"
for the Constitution
which was
written by "remarkable
individuals" who "really did
have a vision."- Extending
the religious metaphor,
Dodd concluded his testimony
with by saying that
The foundation stones of
the world's most
eSSt
e
eriment in dem ° CraC
at
stake
stake.
TL
The c"
crisis will be one. y
No one can
predict the outcome.
if we go astray" how
r t0 histor ?
* " The choice Is
,
yours.
youL" if you chose
to reject this
resolution you will enjoy, I
believe, the
blessing of history. 22
1

?fT

While Dodd speaks in the hyperbole
of the
politician, he is not alone in the use
of this

language.

Lawrence Tribe of the Harvard Law School

is

frequently quoted by various speakers as
having said
constitutional convention would be "a perilous
undertaking."

Thomas Emerson said, "...a

constitutional convention could destroy the whole
system." 23

Samuel Rabinove, Legal Director of the

American Jewish Committee, described his organization
as a national one with 50,000 members which since its

inception in 1906 "has been very concerned about the
20 See GAE Testimony,

3/18/85, p. 532.

2X See GAE Testimony
3/18/85,
22 See GAE Testimony,

p.

552.

3/18/85, p. 540.

22 See GAE Testimony
3/18/85, p.

513.

a

constitutional rights, freedoms
and responsibility of
all Americans.— He said
his committee "believes

that
the calls for a constitutional
convention are likely to
do more harm than good,... our
country may be moving
into a major constitutional
crisis which could do
serious damage to the body politic." 25

Scott Feigelstein, Director of the
Connecticut
Regional Office of the Anti-Defamation
League of B'Nai
B'Rith went further and said, "...The call
for
a

constitutional convention does violence to the
very

democratic traditions and ideals which the
league.

.

.have long fought to establish and maintain." 2 "

This sentiment was echoed by Joyce Kathan,
Legislative

Chair of the American Association of University
Women
who said that
We firmly believe that the calling of a
Constitutional Convention presents a very
real danger to the integrity of the U.S.
Constitution, which is renowned throughout
the world for the protection it affords for
the rights of individuals against the power
of the state ... .Except for a declaration of
war, a call for a Constitutional Convention
is the single most important act our
government could possibly undertake. 27

2*

See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 554.

2B See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p.

555.

28 See GAE

Testimony 3/18/85,

p.

587.

27 See GAE

Testimony 3/18/85,

p.

713.

Speaker after speaker
portrayed the call for
a
constitutional convention
as an attack on the
constitution and especially
on the Bill of Rig hts.
The
supreme irony, of course,
is that it is the

Constitution, itself, where
we find the convention
method for amending the
document,
while the framers

of

the Constitution structured
the amending process in
such a way as to make it
difficult to amend the
document, they did not make it
impossible.
Nor could

they have and still have
claimed to have
The "great experiment" of 1787

a

democracy.

was to secure a

government in the people's hands
by enumerating its
limits in a written constitution,
its innovation,

beyond that of the separation of
powers structure, was
democracy, itself, in a large republic.
The document
was to guarantee the democracy,
not replace it.
In the testimony is an unart
iculated vision of

what a constitutional convention would
be.

The

opponents implicitly portrayed a convention
as an

assembly that would, on its own and without
ratification by the rest of the country, change the

Constitution in its own narrow interest.

Those who

would attend the convention were represented as

minority extremists

-

the kind of extremist who is

consistently defeated at the polls when they run for
public office.

The proponents unsuccessfully tried to

149

Pierce this

i

mage

.

LoU is Weber, a political
scientist

fro, Kentucky who testified
in favor of the
convention
suggested an alternative
view saying that
again ° nce you P ul1 the
veil back
?r™'*.K°
from the convention
we'rpe left Wltn
It not
Z
'
some
= m =„nf a
i
sort of
magical,
mystical beast, but a
distinguished gathering of
C
successful
and
Citi2ens ' caLfully "rk ng
,

tlvTnaTa

they hooe ITlt

leSislatnr-

Tut and
an ame ^men? which
6 acce P tabl e to
ratifying

de£Mt

of^n^ta^

in

^ — ^-ths

Implicit, too, in the opponents'
arguments was a
Picture of an apathetic uninvolved
public which could
be easily seduced or circumvented.
The if-it-ain't-broke-don't-fix-it
theme persisted
as well throughout the testimony.
John Hardiman, a

vice-president with Connecticut Common Cause,
described
himself as a "fanatic for the Bill of Rights"
and

commented that, "Our form of government
for us." 29

is

just right

The biggest fear, however, was that there

would be a "runaway convention."

Here the worry was

that a convention called to propose a balanced
budget

amendment would not be limited to that purpose and
would instead consider amendments such as a "right to
life" amendment, a line-item veto, a return to the gold

standard or some other horrible that was frequently
paraded before the committee.

When a member of the GAE

"

See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 592.

29

See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 718 and 719.

.

Committee suggested to Judy
Goldsmith of NOW that this
might be an opportunity to get
the Equal Rights
Amendment into the Constitution,
she replied,

-now is

unwilling to risk the threat to our
existent
fundamental liberties posed by this

call for a

potentially volatile constitutional
convention
She,

.

»«

too,

closed her remarks in a religious
tone by
quoting George Will who had written that
It is alleged in Scripture that
Shadrach,
Meshach and Abednego passed through the
burning fiery furnace with nary a hair
singed.
Perhaps the Constitution could pass
through a convention similarly unscathed.
But that would be a miracle.
There are
precedents for miracles, see again Scripture,
but it is best to take auxiliary
precautions 31

This was the chief concern of Thomas Emerson who,
in
his testimony argued that
We think that the risks of a constitutional
convention are definitely unacceptably high.
The most important point of a constitutional
convention is the question of whether it can
be limited to a specific subject, or whether
it can roam at will and deal with amendments
to all parts of the Constitution, in effect,
rewriting the Constitution. Constitutional
experts are divided, right down the line on
this question. 3a

This division of opinion on the constitutional

questions involved in a convention was the source of
30 See GAE

Testimony 3/18/85,

31 See GAE

Testimony 3/18/85, p. 619-20.

32 See GAE

Testimony 3/18/85,

p.

p.

618.

506.
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further fear, within the
testimony is a constant chant
of "too many unknowns."
The proponents of the
can
tried to counter this
concern with assurances of
"safeguards;" the biggest one
une Deing
beino that
n, =f any
convention
proposal had to be ratified by
the people.
The people,
however, were what the
opponents feared, state Senator
Lovegrove, a member of the
une uAh.
GAP Committee,
rnmmi*-^
remarked on
this fear saying that
i:

f
he
P ° nSOrs of th *s resolution.
ve°klnd nf madG
^
Up my mind but
thing
'
2
I
hit just
t dawned
that
on me, that all the speakers
who oppose this seem to have
in
that you don't trust the voters common is
who are going
*
6 delegates, to be
responsible^
vl
You don't trust the delegates
when chosen to
represent the people of their district
or
state to be responsible. You don't
trust the
legislature, should an irresponsible
amendment come from this convention to
the
legislatures to be adopted. 33
I

hU

Unlike Senator Lovegrove, State Representative

Jonathan Pelto was anything but sanguine about
the
prospect of a convention.

constitutional faith.

He,

too, had a deep

He said that

I'm speaking today on something that I feel
is more important - I feel stronger about it
than perhaps anything I've ever felt before
in my life.
The Constitution of the United
States is our greatest and most sacred
document.
It is something that we can all
look to as a guiding force in our democratic
lives.
It is the reason that I think many of
us feel both comfortable and protected each
and every day that we live.
It is something
that is so fundamental to our existence that
that is the reason I rise to oppose a
33 See GAE

Testimony 3/18/85,

p.

558-559.

.
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important
importantly,
I

am not

a

amendm «nt, and more
constitutions! convention.

constitutional lawver
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Ruth Tenza, member of
District 1199 ln the Noitheast
Health care Employees Union
and "a woman, and a mother
and a registered nurse"
testified that
the s P ea *ers talked about
fear

and
"
id We
^Mng
to fear but ?e
r ^ I've walked on
fSar ltsel£
tinllt 1*
ve "ganized in some
tough
iZl
eS
WOrk « a Psychiatric
Zl Se iV'i:
injured
™
It'
J been mu 99 e " Caassaulted,
6aSl1 ^ an * *e„
"
came here
he» this
thl,' morning,
was very
a

a

1

^

R ° OS

e

-

1

-

I
1

^
1

<3,

I

apprehensive about the prospect of
a
Constitutional Convention. After
listening
to more than eight hours of
testimony, I am
absolutely terrified at the prospect
of a
Constitutional Convent ion 3a

She then described the Constitution
as "the very fabric
of our society." 3 *

Trudy Morrow from North Branford and

citizen agreed.

She said,

34 See GAE

It isn't just the

it is something that you can't

Testimony 3/18/85,

p.

3a See GAE
Testimony 3/18/85, p.
3*

naturalized

"You've got a Constitution

that's really like the rock bed.
deed to my property

a

558-559.
664.

See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 665.

even split like an
atom...

at

is

God.""

The

Constitution was depicted not
as the document that
defines our democracy but
as the democracy itself.
is the "very fabric
of our society."
« It

must be "preserved" at all
costs

-

ls God .„

It

^

even at the cost of

democracy.

Professor of Law at Western New
England College,
Peter Adomeit, said, "A second
Constitutional
Convention would place that
tezxmilL in danger." and
"You're about to make a political
decision
of high

importance, and

I

urge you to protect the
Constitution,

and as Lincoln placed the
preservation of the union
above all else, so you should place
preservation of the

Constitution above all else, including even

budget.-"

a balanced

The religious metaphor in the testimony

casts the "document" in the mold of the "sacred."

As

such, the document is handed down to the
people by the

framers and thus to be revered rather than revised.
The document does not simply define and delimit a

government.

It constitutes a people;

be remade at will.

a people cannot

The Constitution that must be

preserved is the specific current document not

constitutional democracy per se.

a

Martin Margolies who

37 See GAE Testimony
3/18/85,

p.

678-79.

38 See GAE Testimony
3/18/85,

p.

684 and 685.

Emphasis added.

.
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my God, you are
it's not worth i?"-

France is on its sixteenth
constitution.
it was
France when it wrote its
first document and it is
still
France after writing fifteen
more.

Not so for the

United States according to these
speakers.

if the

Constitution were to be rewritten,
it would be the
destruction of one nation and the

birth of another.

The United States is a nation
of laws not of men.

Originally, this was meant to connote
the divine right of kings.

a

it has come,

speakers, to be taken literally.

repudiation of
for these

The nation is the

Constitution, not the people who would "tamper"
with
the "sacred document."

m

this testimony, we see the

Constitution become an impediment to the democracy
symbolizes

39 See GAE
Testimony 3/26/85,

p.

1481-1482.

it

It is well known that
Thomas Jefferson advocated

that every generation have

a

constitutional convention.

The United states has not
taken Jefferson's advice
believing that on the one hand
it has been unnecessary
and on the other that the
descendants of the "founding
fathers" were not up to the
task.
For the opponents of
the call for a second
constitutional convention, there
is simply no one today of
the calibre of the framers.
Having already depicted the
convention as a hotbed of
extremist factions, it was an easy
step to cast Jerry
Falwell and Angela Davis in the role
of "new framer"
and find the specter ominous.

Ernest Newton, President of the
Bridgeport City
Council, found "frightening" the thought
of who would
be the new "founders."

He was worried about "hidden

agendas" and that blacks would not be fairly
represented.

"So

I

am totally against it," he said and

then asked, "[Do] we have a new founding fathers...?
[That question]

is

frightening to me.""

The fact

that it is slavery and not the rights of black

Americans that the first founding fathers protected
lost on Mr. Newton.
the document.

The years have faded that stain on

In the fervor of their worship of the

original framers, the speakers become revisionist

historians attributing the gloss put on the
•4

O

is

See GAE Testimony 3/26/85, p. 1409.

Constitution by the mere mortals
of the 20th century
to
the slave-holding demi-gods
of the
18th.

Maintaining the vision of the
framers
important sub-text of the testimony.

is an

At times there is

a sense that

it

is tfcajJL

holding for safe keeping.

document that we are only
At other times, however,

the

speakers articulate their own sense
of what does and
does not belong in the Constitution.
Their opposition
to the balanced budget amendment
springs from
their

vision of what purpose the Constitution
serves in their
own estimation.
Thomas Emerson spells this out in
his

testimony saying that
The Constitution, by and large, is
a document
which spells out the structure of government
and the rights of individuals, viz a viz
government power.
It does not spell out
specific economic or social policies. The
only occasion on which our Constitution was
amended to deal with a social policy was a
prohibition amendment, the 18th amendment,
and that was repealed in the 21st amendment.
It was a disaster.
Those questions should be
dealt with in accordance with our present
constitutional structure. They should not be
incorporated into the Constitution
«l
itself

Senator Dodd was also worried that "temporary problems"
would find "a home in something that was not

temporary document."* 2

a

State Representative Dudchik

argued that a balanced budget amendment "would be a
41

See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 510.

*2

See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 552.

-

.

violation of the spirit
and purpose of the United
Stated constitution.
Fiscal policy has no place
fundamental law of the republic.

..

in

.Loading the

Constitution with policy
preference cheapens the
document M<* a
.

The recurring thought
was that the Constitution
is
a "fundamental law" not
a list of policy
preferences.
This was not just the vision
of the framers but of
these speakers, themselves.
There is a vacillation,
then, between keeping the
flame alive in the temple of
the founding fathers and
asserting their own sense of

constitutionalism,

of course,

their own sense is

closely aligned with what they
perceived to be that of
the framers.
Interestingly, not once did

any of these

speakers who had such

a

strong sense of what the

framers wanted and what they, themselves,
wanted in the
Constitution did any of them suggest that they
were the

likely candidates to be delegates to

a

constitutional

convention 44

+3

4*

See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 615.

In a conversation with the author on June 27,
1989, William Olds, Executive Director of the
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, said that should the
convention be called, the CCLU would immediately work
to get delegates compatible with the CCLU elected.
He
did not see the CCLU pursuing a strategy of fighting
through litigation the legitimacy of some of the
previous votes taken in other states.

The urge to preserve and
protect goes beyond the
words on the paper.
The opponents were concerned
about
enforceability as well.
if an amendment were

unenforceable, it would undermine
the overall authority
of the document.
The ghost of prohibition
was raised
by several besides Thomas
Emerson above. A University
of Connecticut political
scientist said, "We've had one
clear precedent of trying to
enact a public policy by
amending the Constitution, and that
was the infamous
prohibition amendment which took us
decades to recover
from.

.

.

.

The dialogue between the opponents
and the

proponents around the issue of enforceability
brought
out two visions of how the Constitution
actually works.

The picture we get from the proponents is
that of a

self-actualizing document.

A minister who favored the

call believed that, "the amendment drafted and
approved

would mandate some common sense."* 6

Another said "Let

me prove the point that words on the paper of the

Constitution do solve problems .. .as long as the Supreme
Court respects the Constitution and as long as we

respect the Supreme Court, those words have

meaning .... As
I

J

a matter of mechanism,

4B See GAE Testimony 3/16/85, p.
** See GAE

the framers in

1431.

Testimony 3/26/85, p. 1435.

Philadelphia gave you

a

way.^

enforcement of the Constitution
"mechanical" process.

For these proponentS/
is an

automatic

Mr. Palmer of the
Taxpayers

Foundation testified that
The Congress has tried honestly,
I
believe to
hold down spending.
President Reagan has tried

astern
system
a

T^**
that rewards

C

*™ 0t

^^1 the

increased spending and

of

punishes fiscal responsibility.^

implicitly, then, when all else
fails, put it in the
Constitution and then the issue, removed
from

"politics," can be resolved.

Representative Dudchik with his usual
passion,
counters this thinking saying that
...despite the warnings of our founding
fathers, proponents of this resolution to
mandate federal balanced budgets have flocked
to the Constitution as the Cowardly Lion
to
the Wizard of Oz, to plead for courage and
discipline that they have been unable to
force upon themselves
This resolution is
the easy way out, a political quick fix.
It's political cowardice at its worst,
it is
evasive, unworthy, and essentially a
political exercise.
I'll finish by saying,
the oldest living Constitution in the world
should not be dragged on stage to perform
such charades. * s

When it came to the issue of enforceability, the

opponents change from reverent apostles of the faith to

pragmatic politicians who look to the bottom line.
«7

See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 573 and p. 575.

*B

See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 617.

4»

See GAE Testimony 3/28/85, p. 617.

There is only a brief
digression to political
realities, however.
Generally, in spite of the
fact
that the speakers were with
few exceptions seasoned
politicians and lobbyists, there
was little evidence in
their testimony that they
had ever witnessed politics
at work.
While they, themselves, were
members of a
traditionally moderate to conservative
general
assembly, they feared that the
electorate who had sent
them to Hartford as legislators
would choose
the head

of the Communist Party or the
Klu Klux Klan when it

came to selecting delegates to a
constitutional

convention.

These same politically savy people to
whom

the use of parliamentary maneuver had
become second

nature feared they would have to stand idly
by as
"extremists" steamrolled away the United States
as they
knew it.
Not everyone who testified in opposition
believed
that reverence for the Constitution meant leaving
it as
it is.

Hugh McGill, Associate Dean for Academic

Affairs at the University of Connecticut School of Law,

testified that
I happen to think that all constitutional
law
that passes through the rules that we know,
rests upon an underlying political consensus
and a bed or seed really, of constitutional
politics and I am as exillerated (sic) as I
am scared of what would happen if we took the
lid of rules off and allowed the people
directly to reconsider the basic

possibilities upon which they
wish their
government to be framed and
conducted =°
This spirit was shared
by one of the political

scientists who testified in
favor of the call, Clyde
McKee of Trinity College in
Hartford, who asked
are 6 S ° reluctant to use
the procedures
K
that we have
had for nearly 200 years"?
Because we are fearful that we
lack the
courage, the wisdom and the
talent to make
them skillfully? What will
happen if we do
not practice using these
constitutional
procedures for another 200 years? We
may
become so politically
Dolitirsl v impotent
m ™4-««+- that ...
we will
be incapable
>le to gove;
govern [sic] ourselves
democratic nation. 51

t^

l

.

i

"f

Conclus nn
i

What we learn from the testimony in
Connecticut

is

that the Constitution commands an extraordinary

reverence; and, that this reverence has truncated

genuine discussion of it.

The recent calls from Louis

Fisher and Sanford Levinson for dialogues and

conversation and from John Brigham and Sotirios Barber
for greater popular participation in giving meaning to

the document fall on mostly deaf ears.

Sanford

Levinson's Constitutional Faith pointed out an

ambivalence between "patriotism measured as commitment

so See GAE

Testimony 2/18/85,

p.

575.

31 See GAE

Testimony 3/18/85,

p.

577.

to constitution*!

deals « and »a wariness
about a tooeager willingness to celebrate
one's own country,
i

including the celebration o£
its constitution.-!
bevinson warns against a
constitutional faith that is
all celebration and which
stops short of seeking
new
answers through deeper conversations.
His hope is that
the Constitution will provide
the language for that

conversation.

if out of a misplaced
reverence,

however, we limit the use of this
language to nine
"high priests," the Constitution
will

fail us as that

common tongue.
A political scientist had the last
word on the
subject of a second constitutional convention
before
the committee.
in, perhaps fitting, juxtaposition
to
the first speaker who saw a constitutional
convention
as too great a risk, John Rourke offered a
little-heard

view saying that
The delegates to the constitutional
convention, ah, some were brilliant, some
were mundane. Mr. Hamilton wanted to have a
king.
What I'm concerned about is democracy.
What I support philosophically is the idea
that we need to look at our system
periodically. That we probably need to
change our system or at least consider very
seriously change to our system. That we
ought to give as much democracy to the people
as we can. 83

32 See GAE Testimony
4/2/85,

p.

1980.

See GAE Testimony 4/1/85, p. 1980.
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While the Constitution can
be encased in
Plexiglass and enshrined beyond
our touch in order to
preserve it, democracy can not
be encased in that way
and really be preserved.
Democracy requires an ongoing self-analysis and all the
risk that entails.
This appeared unclear to many who
testified in

Connecticut.

Only with reluctance could a few
of the
opponents justify a second constitutional
convention
for any reason and then only in
the case of something
like the Civil War or the Great Depression.
There was

an unarticulated sense that a second
constitutional

convention would somehow not be legitimate.
Apparently, our otherwise perfect Constitution
flawed in Article V.

is

.

CHAPTER

6

CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICSINTERPRETIVE ACTIVITY IN AMERICA
Why study constitutional
politics?

I
claimed at
the beginning of this
dissertation that the public
law
field has gone astray by limiting
itself

to the

Constitution in the appellate courts,
and especially
the Supreme Court, when the
full
picture of American

constitutional politics

is more than this.

A

perspective limited to the Const itut
ion-in-the-courts
binds us to the concept of constitutionalism
as
purely judicial activity. This leads

a

us to think

the

Constitution can be handled only by legal
professionals
and then we fail to recognize its handling
by others as

constitutional politics.

Professors, congressmen,

lawyers and citizens of various sorts take the
document
into their own hands every day.

When we ignore this

activity we fail to understand how the Constitution
functions in our society.

In this dissertation,

I

have

examined constitutional politics within four
frameworks:

non- instrumental constitutional politics,

competition among theoretical views of
constitutionalism, the elevation of the document above
politics, and institutional life as

constitutional politics.

a

key to

.
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Participation

in

cs

constitution! politic,

is not

always aimed at affecting
specific policy ootco.es.
Constitutional pol itics as
it
presented
^
instrumental than litigation
before

^ ^

u

the cou rts

.

The

aim is often to construct
the conceptual terrain
on
"hich broad policy choices
will be made.

steelworks

Th

of Pennsylvania and
Ohio wanted to take

their fight against
corporate disinvestment out
of the
courts where communitarian
values have received less

recognition to the community
which has authority to
construct a new constitutional
claim developed from the
eminent domain power.
Using the eminent domain
authority to stave off corporate
disinvestment required
the community's coming to
a new understanding of the
property interest that the
Constitution protects. The

community of displaced workers
and movement lawyers'
struggle to reshape its thinking
on the Constitution
and its promise is at the heart
of constitutional
politics
The community property right
movement does not
look to the Supreme Court for
affirmation of its claim
or characterize policy problems
in the simple "rights

and remedies" fashion that Stuart
Scheingold warned

would undermine social transformation.

The myth of

change through the acquisition
of legally defined and
protected individual rights is
pierced in this
struggle.
Instead, the community focuses
on replacing
part of the present culture of
individual competition
and reward with a more communal
social order using the
tactics of grassroots democratic
action to educate the
public on the issues and build consensus
around shared
values.
This is part of that process that
Gerald
Garvey calls determining society's
syntax discussed in
the introduction.
Under this reading, the Constitution
is

understood not as

a

blueprint for a community but

rather as a facilitator of social conversation
on what

constitutes the community.

James Boyd White points to

this activity of facilitation of conversation
as

necessary to the achievement of cultural change
saying
that
To conceive of the law as a rhetorical and
social system, a way in which we use an
inherited language to talk to each other and
to maintain a community, suggests in a new
way that the heart of law is what we always
knew it was:
the open hearing in which one
point of view, one construction of language
and reality, is tested against another.
The
multiplicity of readings that the law permits
is not its weakness but its strength, for it
is this that makes room for different voices

—

.

mnH^j^V
modified in
circumstance

P urchase b y which culture may be
response to the demands of
1

The scholars who convened the
Bicentennial

Conference were also less interested
in defining
specific policy choices than in expanding
the sources
of constitutional meaning and
thereby expanding
the

domain of American constitutional
politics.

They would

define constitutionalism as rights
consciousness and
look to 19th century constitutional
consciousness to

recall the scope of the American constitutional

tradition.

That tradition includes the view that

constitutional arguments are not furthered solely
through litigation but in convention debates and
through personal correspondence as well.

it was

incumbent upon 19th century citizens to form their own
views on the Constitution and promulgate them.

The

Bicentennial scholars' work recalls and promotes this
tradition thus broadening constitutional politics
today.

Congress is an active participant in

constitutional interpretation and thus expands

constitutional politics beyond the door of the Supreme

1

See James Boyd White, When Word s Lose Their
Constitutions and Reconstitutes of
Meaning;
Language, Character, and Community
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 273. This
depiction does not acknowledge the power the status quo
has over law, however.
.

constitutional politics beyond the door
of the Supreme
Court.

Here too, the activity often falls
into general
rather than specific policy areas.
Congress is most
concerned with having ascendance over that
part of the

Constitution dealing with its own powers.

Louis Fisher

makes the case that Congress defers to
the Court

generally but not in the area of separation of
powers.
Here Congress employs its law firms to
argue its own

interpretation before the Court forgoing the use of
the
solicitor general's office in order to stake out
Congress' domain of interpretive practice.
In Connecticut,

the specific policy debate over

a

balanced budget amendment gave way to broader concerns
about appropriate arenas for constitutional

discussions.

The question there was whether or not

constitutional debate should be broadened into the
convention setting.

This could open all aspects of the

Constitution to revision as well as appoint

a

whole new

set of official interpreters in the form of convention

delegates offering the clearest opportunity to expand
interpretive practice beyond the Supreme Court.
Competing Theories of
Constitutionalism
Part of this interpretive practice focuses on the

competition among theoretical views.

Testing competing

readings of the Constitution was the work of the

scholars attending the Bicentennial
Conference at
Amherst. There the competing views
of constitutional
interpretation were resurrected from history.

Recalling the interpretations that did
not win out in
the struggle for meaning casts in
sharper
relief the

views that did win out as well as the
fact of multiple

possibilities of interpretation.

While popular rights

consciousness has been pervasive in American
politics,
the vision of what the Constitution protects
and

promises has not always been the same.

Recapturing

alternative views from the past extends the present

possibilities for the document.

The hold that

tradition has on the document is lessened when we see
that the view that won out was not a monolithic one

even in its own time.
The scholarly activity shared at the Bicentennial

Conference is in the tradition of Herbert

J.

Storing

who reminded us "what the anti-federalists were for." 2

Their rejection of the Constitution of 1787 was in
light of an alternative plan not simply as obstruction.

Those whose 19th century discourse on the document

is

recounted at the Conference were also not simply
against something but rather offered viable

alternatives.
2

Keeping alive the recognition that the

See Herbert J. Storing, What the AntlFederalists Were For (Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 1981).

document has always been open to competing
interpretations is an important enterprise in
itself.
The steelworkers put to the test the view
that the

Constitution

is

the people's document

-

available for

their own direct interpretation even outside the

amendment process.

Establishing the concept of

community property right using

a

a

community's eminent

domain power challenges traditional theories of

constitutional interpretation.

Here, the community is

arguing that a court's interpretation is not necessary
and,

furthermore, neither is a constitutional

amendment.

When Judge Gibson argued for the people as

final interpreter in Eakin v. Rauh.=» he posited the

amending process as the mechanism of that
interpretation.

Community property rights activists

believe their coordinate and equal authority over the

document exists as direct interpreters without falling
back on the amendment process.

This, of course, is a

radical challenge to contemporary constitutional

interpretive theory which is dominated by variations of
judicial review.

Congress challenges traditional judicial review
theory as well.

Harkening back to early republican

arguments most strongly pressed by Thomas Jefferson, we
can see Congress asserting its own variation on
3

12 Sergeant & Rawle

(S.C. Pa.

1825).

.

departmentalism.*

Unlike Thomas Jefferson, however,

Congress does not claim to have coordinate and
equal

authority in all areas of interpretation.

Congress

willingly defers to the Supreme Court in all those
areas not pertaining to separation of powers questions.
In that area,

Congress feels fully competent and equal

to the Supreme Court as an interpreter.

While this, no

doubt, raises questions in many minds, theorists like

Walter Murphy and Louis Fisher endorse Congress'

interpretive practices as both constitutional and
feasible
While these constitutional theorists argue among
themselves, those in Connecticut argue with the

Constitution.

The framers believed that should

Congress attempt to forestall a popular movement to
amend the Constitution by refusing to propose an

amendment, the people could nevertheless have their way
by calling for a constitutional convention.

The

majority of the people testifying at the Connecticut
hearings, however, argued for a constitutional theory

* "The Constitution has erected no such single
tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with
the corruptions of time and party, its members would
become despots.
It is more wisely made all the
departments co-equal and co-sovereign with themselves."
Letter to William Jarvis September 28, 1820, Paul L.
Ford, ed., The Works of Thomas Jefferson (New York:
In Walter F. Murphy et
Putnam's, 1905), XII, 161-164.
al., American C onstitutional Interpretation (Mineola,
New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1986).

that would remove the
document as far as possible
from
amendment by the people.
Under their reading of

constitutionalism, democracy

is

attached to the

existence of the document not
to democratic practice.
Article V of the Constitution
opens the document to
revision at the will of the
people through a proposal
from Congress or a convention.
This
is

constitutionalism as process.

Where the process

is

the

convention method, however, supporters
of democracy
Connecticut fall away.
Elevating the

Const-

i

t ut

in

ion Ahn Ve Polihir-^

Those who testified in Connecticut
on the call for
a second constitutional
convention appeared to be

blinded by their commitment to the
"document of the
framers" and thus lost sight of the
fact

that there has

always been competition over how the
Constitution

should be understood and that competition

is

healthy.

Those who opposed a second constitutional
convention
did so because

they viewed the Constitution as

blueprint no longer subject to revision.
vision of

a

a

This is a

constitution that functions as an end to

debate rather than

a

facilitator of it.

The tenor of

the Connecticut testimony was one of fear and

apprehension about opening the document to revision or
reinterpretation

.

Here the Constitution is a list of

settled claims and consequently to reopen discussion

is

174

reinterpretation.

Here the Constitution is a list
of

settled claims and consequently to
reopen discussion is
to deny where agreement has been
found.
Therefore the
politics center on keeping the debate
closed even
though part of the enterprise of constitutional

interpretation includes not only reinterpretation
but
reaffirmation of settled concepts. This requires
ongoing open debate as well.*
The scholars of the Bicentennial Conference

willingly participate in

a

ongoing open discourse but

they too attempt to elevate the Constitution to
status above politics.
Tushnet'

s

a

This becomes clearest when Mark

essay is juxtaposed with the others.

For

Tushnet, the Constitution does not hold special meaning
or at least does not provide special protections

unavailable from the political process.
others,

it does.

For the

Rights are essentially rooted in the

Constitution and above the play of politics.

While

there can be some debate and disagreement, the

Constitution keeps everything from being up for grabs.
Tushnet argues that everything is always up for grabs
and thus there must be constant vigilance based on

3

In Connecticut, the opponents to a
convention succeeded. What remains to be
the debates in the other states where the
raised and answered affirmatively to hold

second
studied are
question was
another convention.

political action.

The Constitution, according
to
Tushnet, doesn't secure
rights but rather obscures
the
need for political action.
At the end of a pursuit
through traditional

business, political, and legal
practices, the
steelworkers jobs were still up
for grabs and thus
these workers turned to the
Constitution to raise the
ante in the fight for job security.
what no one and

nothing else could do to save jobs,
the Constitution
was called upon to do as job
security was re-conceived
as a constitutional community
property right.

Here the

Constitution is a shield from socioeconomic
forces
rather than a mechanism through which
politics
is

played out.

Congress would have us understand that their
interest in constitutional interpretation is
not self

interested but rather for the purpose of remaining
true
to the document.

The document demands a standard and

adherence to certain principles that removes some

activity from the realm of pure politics.

When

Congress protects its institutional powers under the

separation of powers clause then, it does so, in its
view,

in order to remain true to the

f ramers

•

vision

and the requirements of constitutional government.

Left free to its own devices, Congress might act

otherwise,
it

is

it

i

mp i ie s,

but being bound to the
document,

bound to its higher orders.
Instit-.m-jnp^

Const

Congress

j

t-nh

j

^

U
n

as a
¥n
f e
na l pnl ihip C

the strongest competitor for
the role

is

of constitutional

interpreter with the Supreme Court.

Every time Congress writes

a

law it is participating in

constitutional interpretation.
Congress' view

is

Even here, however,

popularly placed second to that

the Court as tentative,

of

needing Court endorsement.

This is not Congress' view of its
role, however.

We

can see this most clearly in its
response to the Chadha
decision.

Congress

1

instituting its own law offices has

given it an institutional mechanism through
which to
formally interpret the document and press
that

interpretation forward.

This activity not only

furthers what Sotirios Barber calls "constitution

mindedness,"
powers

-

it

cements the principle of separation of

the fundament of our constitutional system.

Consequently, fears voiced around the "problem" of

having multiple interpreters are misplaced because this
is

not only within the bounds of American

political/constitutional theory,

it

is

the way our

constitutional system has always worked.

Louis

Fisher's research in this area
has produced compelling
evidence of this fact. Pisher
shows congress as the
Court's constitutional colleague
working with the Court
not against it.
The executive, too, commonly
offers its own

constitutional interpretations.

More research is

needed here to fully understand
the way all three
branches handle the document. when
the executive began
in the 1920's to refuse
automatically
to defend,

through the solicitor general, acts of
Congress,
asserting itself as the third constitutional

it was

colleague.

This change in the practice of the
executive's always
defending acts of congress through the office
of

solicitor general eventually brought about
the
institution of Congress' Constitutional law
offices so
that it would have its own advocate before
the Court.

This is fertile ground for further research on

separation of powers and the constitutional
interpretive practices of the three branches.
Institutional life is a key to constitutional

politics and the case of Congress makes this point but
others do as well.

The scholars at the Bicentennial

Conference are from the elite law schools from which
future constitutional lawyers, judges, and justices
come.

Their vision of the Constitution and their own

role in constitutional interpretive practice determines

in large measure that
of their

institutions.

These
teachers are significant to
constitutional politics
because of their institutional
affiliations. Part of
their politics is the influencing
of not only their
students, but their institutions.
These institutions
are essentially attached to
the profession of law
which, in turn, is essentially
attached to popular
perceptions of American constitutionalism.

a

Fundamental to the legitimation of the
concept of
constitutional community property right

was first the

endorsement of the idea by religious
institutions and
then later by governmental ones.
Without
these

institutions lending their authority to the
concept, it
would have remained a radical idea outside
mainstream
politics.

One of the most interesting aspects of the

steelworkers' case is the phenomenon of these

institutions embracing the concept.

Looking at the role state legislatures play

is

another institutional key to constitutional politics.

Whether or not there would be a second constitutional

convention was determined by a handful of legislators.
In Connecticut,

institutional rules enabled the

opponents to the convention call to defeat the proposal
in committee where the fewest opposition votes were

.

necessary.

This is in striking contrast
to the

practice of

popular referendum for which
proponents
argued unsuccessfully.
a

The Constitution is attentive
to various
institutions, checking and balancing
powers among them
all.
While the framers wanted the
people to be able to

circumvent Congress to amend the
Constitution, they
nevertheless did not put that power
in the peoples-

hands directly but rather placed
of the state legislatures.

whether or not to call for
a

it

in the

institutions

This keeps the question of
a

constitutional convention

public responsibility instead of an
individual

preference.

The testimony before the committee

confirms this as when it frequently
refers to the power
and responsibility that the committee
holds.

members of

a

It

is

as

committee that they are to decide on the

convention call.

Consequently, the arguments used for

and against appeal not to individual
citizens but to

institutional actors.
Conclusion
The significance of the politics examined in this

thesis rests as much in the fact of these politics as
in

its content.

We do not have a new dominant vision

of constitutional property thanks to the s teelworkers

They have, however, planted
a seed that may in
time
bear further fruit.
For now, their most important
contribution is in encouraging
other than legal
professionals to take the document
into their own

hands.

The Bicentennial Conference
scholars' task was,
perhaps, easier.
Their goal was to further the
use of
the language of rights in discourse
on the

Constitution.

This is well within the American

constitutional tradition.

They, too, however, were

seeking to open up new ground for debate.

m

recalling

nineteenth century discourse they, like
the
steelworkers, were hailing a more communitarian
thrust
in constitutional interpretation.

While those

testifying in Connecticut appeared to be

obstructionists to interpretation rather than
interpreters themselves, they were, in fact, also

participating in constitutional interpretative
practice.

Their interpretation of the document and of

constitutionalism is that it
expectations

-

is a list of settled

not a foundation for open debate.

They

see "constitution mindedness" as most appropriate for
the Supreme Court.

Their constitution is a judicial

rather than a political document and thus best left in
the hands of those trained in the law.

Congress, on

the other hand, does see the Constitution as a

political document

—

what better branch to handle it

than the peoples' branch?

it is,

after all, a question

of handling it rather than
monopolizing it.

Congress
does not claim it should have
the final say on the
Constitution.
it does claim (through its actions)
to
have authority over interpretation
in those areas where
congressional interest and expertise come
into the

fore, however.

Congress, the steelworkers, the Bicentennial
Scholars, and those testifying in Connecticut
are all

"constitution minded."

Their attention to the document

calls for our attention to them.

This dissertation has

exposed some of the constitutional interpretive

practices taking place outside the Courts and it calls
upon the public law field to take account of this

political activity as constitutional interpretive
practice.

It has also taken on Martin Shapiro's

essential task of the political scientist --

undertaking the "careful description of what one real
person says to another real person, when, how, and why"
and found that real people

—

not just courts

—

are talking to other real people about the

Constitution.

Ultimately, it is this conversation

that, together with the views of the courts, forms the

full picture of American constitutional politics.

Society needs to build consensus on policy issues.
Part of this process is carried on in the language and

syntax o £

182
t he

Constitution.

Whlle maklnq tne
Supreme

court the Oracle at
Delphi truncates that
process,
constitutional politics helps.
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